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GAYFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BASED AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION POLICIES
PETER NICOLAS*
ABSTRACT

Twenty-five years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court established a
consistency principle in its race-based equal protection cases. That
principle requires courts to apply the same strict scrutiny to racial
classifications designed to benefit racial minorities-such as affirmative
action policies-as they do to laws invidiously discriminating against
them.
The new consistency principle, under which discrimination against
whites is subject to strict scrutiny, conflicted with the Court's established
criteria for declaring a group to be a suspect or quasi-suspect class
entitled to heightened scrutiny, which focused on such considerations as
the history of discrimination against the group and its political
powerlessness.
As a result of this tension, the Court's line ofprecedentsfor identifying
new suspect and quasi-suspect classes has gone dormant, and the Court
has not since considered whether any additional such classes exist.
Instead, when confronted with plausible candidates for heightened
scrutiny, such as gays and lesbians, the Court has engaged in sporadic
applicationofstealth rationalbasis review.
In this Article, I use a hypothetical equal protection challenge to a
sexual orientation-based affirmative action policy as a vehicle for
proposing a roadmapfor harmonizing these competing lines ofprecedent.
I demonstrate that, in light of the consistency principle, an aggrieved
heterosexual can bring a challenge to such a policy and seek heightened
equal protection scrutiny even though the Court has yet to establish
heightened scrutinyfor laws discriminatingagainstgays and lesbians.
I conclude that such a harmonization of the Court's equal protection
precedents will reinvigorate the Court's moribund precedents for
identifying new suspect and quasi-suspect classes. Moreover, I conclude
that announcing heightened scrutiny in such a case would present a
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particularly appealing vehicle to the Court's center, represented by
Justice Kennedy, whose jurisprudence demonstrates both supportfor gay
rights and hostility toward affirmative actionpolicies.
INTRODUCTION

For much of American history, knowledge that a current or prospective
student or employee was gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender was likely
to result in the person losing their employment' or being expelled from
their college or university.2 Yet, as developments in both the judicial and
legislative spheres have simultaneously resulted in the invalidation of laws
criminalizing same-sex sexual activity3 and the validation of same-sex
relationships, many employers and institutions of higher education have
stopped treating one's status as a sexual minority as a negative
consideration and have instead come to view it as irrelevant to
employment and admissions decisions.
Still, what if-just as with racial minorities and women-public
universities and employers decided not merely to react to the history of
discrimination against sexual minorities by treating such status as
irrelevant, but instead treated it as a positive consideration in making
employment and admissions decisions? In other words, could a public
employer or university decide that it would henceforth treat a prospective
student's or employee's status as a sexual minority as a "plus" factor, or
even establish specific hiring and admissions quotas? To justify doing so,
would they have to point to their own specific history of discriminating
against sexual minorities, or could they rely instead on general societal
discrimination against that group? Could they instead justify such a policy
on the grounds that it contributes to the diversity of the workplace or
classroom, as a way to increase the provision of services to the LGBT
community, or as a means of providing role models for LGBT youth?
Moreover, if a heterosexual individual aggrieved by such a policy brought
an equal protection5 challenge against it, what level of judicial scrutiny

1. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432-33 & n.25 (Conn. 2008);
Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 889 (Iowa 2009).
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM WRIGHT, HARVARD'S SECRET COURT: THE SAVAGE 1920 PURGE OF

CAMPUS HOMOSEXUALS (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudenceand the Apartheid of
the Closet, 1946-1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 749-50 (1997).
3. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
&

4. See PETER NICOLAS & MIKE STRONG, THE GEOGRAPHY OF LOVE: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION IN AMERICA (THE STORY IN MAPS) 3-10 (5th ed. 2014).

5. This Article refers to "equal protection" generally as opposed to the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to encompass not only the latter-which is applicable only to the
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would a court apply to such a claim? Would the policy be subject only to
the highly deferential rational basis review, or could the petitioner argue
for intermediate, strict, or the "more searching form" 6 of rational basis
review? What impact would the level of scrutiny have on the
constitutionality of such a policy?
Although such affirmative action policies are yet to be established-at
least as a formal matter-the foundation necessary for developing them in
the future is being laid, as public entities begin to collect data on the
sexual orientation of prospective applicants. For example, in December
2012, the University of Iowa became the first public university to include
questions about their applicants' sexual orientation and gender identity on
their admission applications.7 Subsequently, several public law schools
began to include such a question on their admission applications.8 In
addition, in 2013, Scholastica 9-a website that facilitates the submission
of manuscripts to law reviews-created controversy amongst legal
academics by asking authors to indicate their sexual orientation and gender
identity in their profiles and forwarding that information to law review
editors, including those at public universities.o This led to claims that law
reviews housed at public universities that made selection decisions based

states-but also to the "equal protection" component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which applies to the federal government and is identical in scope. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224, 226-27 (1995).
6. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).
7. See University of Iowa Becomes First School to Add Sexual Orientation Question to
Application, Fox NEWS (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/12/12/university-iowabecomes-first-school-to-add-sexual-orientation-question-to/,
archived at http://perma.cc/8LNW-

6VW8. Although the University of Iowa was the first public university to do so, it was preceded by
Elmhurst College, a private college. See Eric Hoover, Elmhurt College Will Ask Applicants About
Sexual Orientation, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 23, 2011), http://chronicle.comlblogs/

headcount/elmhurst-college-will-ask-applicants-about-sexual-orientation/28553?sid=at&utm

source=

at&utm medium-=en, archivedat http://perma.cc/KKJ2-QMN2.
8. See Mary Sette, New Question Consideredfor LGBT Law Applicants, GW HATCHET (Feb. 4,
2013), http://www.gwhatchet.com/2013/02/04/a-new-question-for-lgbt-law-applicants/,
archived at

http://perma.cc/J4LW-YWWS.
9. For

more

a

more

detailed

description

of Scholastica,

browse

the

website

at

https://scholasticahq.com.
10. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Journalson Scholastica "Ask Authors to Submit Demographic
Information" for "Diversity Initiatives," JOSH BLACKMAN'S BLOG (Feb. 11, 2013), http://josh

blackman.com/blog/2013/02/I l/joumals-on-scholastica-ask-authors-to-submit-demographic-informationfor-diversity-initiatives/, archived at http://perma.cc/M5L9-HNT4; Scholastica's Diversity Question,

PRAWFsBLAWG (Feb. 13, 2013), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/

02/scholasticas-

diversity-question.html, archived at http://perma.cc/G9EH-62CL; Dave Hoffman, Scholastica & Law
Review Selection, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.concurringopinions.com/

archives/2013/02/scholastica-law-review-selection.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WJT3-GA96.
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on such criteria were open to a constitutional challenge on equal protection
grounds.
The constitutionality of affirmative action policies targeted at sexual
minorities-herein dubbed "gayffirmative action"-stands at the
intersection of three distinct lines of equal protection precedents. The first,
culminating in the Court's 2013 opinion Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin"' and hereinafter referred to as the Adarandl2 line of precedent, has
made it increasingly more difficult for public entities to implement
affirmative action policies targeted at racial minorities. It has done so by
applying a principle of "consistency" that requires such policies to be
subject to the same "strict scrutiny" that the Court applies to state action
discriminating against racial minorities.1 3 As a result, the Court has held
that justifications for race-based affirmative action policies, such as
creating role models for minority children,1 4 increasing the provision of
services to minority communities, 5 and as a remedy for general past
societal discrimination, are constitutionally insufficient.' 6 Instead, only a
handful of rationales that the Court has deemed to be "compelling"-such
as the interests in remedying the government entity's own past
discrimination against that group (as contrasted with general past societal
discrimination)' 7 and the interest in creating a diverse student body' 8-are
constitutionally sufficient to justify such policies. Moreover, applying
strict scrutiny, the Court has held that even when invoking this narrow set
of constitutionally sufficient justifications for such policies, the means of
accomplishing those rationales must be very finely tuned and
individualized and thus cannot be accomplished through such means as
setting quotas.' 9

11. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
12. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
13. See id. at 224, 227, 229-30.
14. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1986) (plurality opinion).
15. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310-11 (1978) (Powell, J.). The
opinion is somewhat unclear on whether the Court did not find this interest to be sufficiently
compelling, or if instead the policy was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieving that goal, or
both.

16. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 731-32 (2007)
(plurality opinion); Croson, 488 U.S. at 496-97; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
17. See supra note 16.
18. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
19. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
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The second line of equal protection precedent, culminating in the
Court's 2013 opinion in United States v. Windsor2 0 and hereinafter
referred to as the Moreno21 line of precedent, has made it increasingly
difficult for governmental entities to discriminate against sexual
minorities by declaring unconstitutional laws that discriminate on that
basis. 22 In this line of cases, the Court has side-stepped the question
whether laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation should be
subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. Rather, in each of the cases in this
line of precedents, the Court invoked its earlier holding in United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno2 3 that "a bare ... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group" is not a legitimate governmental interest even
under rational basis review.24
The third line of equal protection precedent-which has sat dormant
since the Court announced its principle of "consistency" and hereinafter
25
referred to as the Frontiero line of precedent-sets forth the criteria for
deciding whether or not to accord heightened scrutiny to a given
classification when challenged on equal protection grounds. Because this
line of precedent predates the "consistency" line of precedent, many of the
factors focus on the specific class against whom state action is directed
(such as African Americans or women) rather than the classification
employed (such as race or sex). Included among the factors are
(1) whether the group against whom the classification is directed has
suffered from a history of discrimination; (2) whether the group is
politically powerless; (3) whether the characteristic at issue is obvious or
visible; (4) whether the characteristic at issue bears any relationship to
ability to perform or contribute to society; and (5) whether the
characteristic at issue is immutable.2 6

20. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
21. See U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
22. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675 (declaring federal Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional,
applying equal protection component of Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 574-75 (2003) (declaring state sodomy laws violate Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, but acknowledging Equal Protection Clause as a conceivable alternative basis for
doing so); id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (applying Equal Protection Clause); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (declaring Colorado's Amendment 2 unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause).
23. 413 U.S. at 534-35.
24. Id. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35.
25. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
26. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587,
602-03 (1987); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
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A gayffirmative action policy that fell short of the standards imposed
by the Court for race-based affirmative action policies would effect a
merger of these three lines of equal protection cases and would require the
Court to resolve a number of difficult questions that have been percolating
in the background of equal protection jurisprudence ever since the Court
switched its focus-at least so far as race and sex are concerned-from
suspect classes to suspect classifications.
Consider, for example, a public medical school that establishes an
affirmative action policy designed to increase the number of gay and
transgender medical students, and, ultimately, doctors. Suppose that the
school cites two rationales for the policy: a desire to provide LGBT youth
with positive role models, and a desire to increase the provision of medical
services to members of the LGBT community, which the school believes
have special medical needs that are often overlooked by heterosexual
doctors. Moreover, suppose that, instead of merely considering it a "plus"
factor in making admissions decisions, the school dedicates five percent of
the seats in its class to sexual minorities, estimating that to be their
percentage of the general population.
While such a policy, if race-based, would clearly not pass
constitutional muster if challenged by an aggrieved white individual, the
constitutionality of such a policy, when challenged by a heterosexual
similarly aggrieved by it, turns on the answers to a number of important
questions, nearly all of which remain open. If such a law is subject merely
to rational basis review, would it pass constitutional muster? Will the
Court eventually apply the Frontiero line of precedent to hold that laws
discriminating against sexual minorities are subject to intermediate or
strict scrutiny? If so, will the Adarand line of precedent compel the Court
to hold that laws discriminating against heterosexuals are similarly subject
to that heightened level of judicial scrutiny? If heightened scrutiny is not
established for laws that discriminate against sexual minorities at the time
an aggrieved heterosexual brings suit, could he simultaneously invoke the
criteria for applying heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate against
sexual minorities set forth in the Frontiero line of precedent, coupled with
the "consistency" principle set forth in the Adarand line of precedent, to
justify the application of intermediate or strict scrutiny to the law? To the
extent that there was evidence that the policy was motivated by "animus"
against heterosexuals, could the aggrieved plaintiff seek to have the Court

Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442-46 (1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976);
Frontiero,411 U.S. at 684-88; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
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apply the "more searching form" of rational basis review set forth in the
Moreno line of precedent, in reliance on the ground that heterosexuals are
a "politically unpopular group?" Finally, if the state in which the medical
school is located has established precedent subjecting laws discriminating
against sexual minorities to a higher level of scrutiny as a matter of state
constitutional law than that applicable under federal equal protection
jurisprudence, and the plaintiff invokes that state constitutional provision,
would the state be compelled as a matter of federal equal protection
jurisprudence to apply the principle of "consistency" and extend
heightened scrutiny to laws discriminating against heterosexuals?
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a brief overview of
equal protection jurisprudence in general and traces the development of
the Frontiero, Adarand, and Moreno lines of precedent. Part II of this
Article demonstrates that-in the absence of heightened equal protection
scrutiny
for sexual orientation
classifications-a quota-based
gayffirmative action policy justified by such goals as creating role models
for LGBT youth and providing services to the LGBT community would
easily pass constitutional muster under traditional rational basis review.
Part III independently examines the Frontiero and Adarand lines of
precedent to demonstrate that laws discriminating against sexual
minorities should eventually be deemed by the Court to be subject to
intermediate or strict scrutiny and that the "consistency" principle likely
will require that same level of scrutiny to be applied to laws discriminating
against heterosexuals. Part IV of this Article addresses the question
whether a heterosexual individual aggrieved by such an affirmative action
policy can argue for heightened scrutiny-even in the absence of
precedent establishing intermediate or strict scrutiny for laws
discriminating against sexual minorities-either by invoking the Frontiero
and Adarand lines of precedent in tandem or invoking the Moreno line of
precedent. Part V of this Article addresses the question whether a state
with established precedent subjecting laws discriminating against sexual
minorities to a higher level of scrutiny as a matter of state constitutional
law than that applicable under federal equal protection jurisprudence
would be compelled as a matter of federal equal protection jurisprudence
to apply the principle of "consistency" and extend heightened scrutiny to
laws discriminating against heterosexuals.
This Article proposes that these three lines of equal protection
precedent can best be harmonized by formally recognizing two separate
methods of obtaining heightened equal protection scrutiny that are an
outgrowth of the factors identified in the Frontiero line of precedent.
Under this approach, the political powerlessness factor stands on its own
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as a basis for obtaining a "more searching form" of rational basis review
for laws targeting a politically unpopular group. This is represented by the
Moreno line of precedent and is focused exclusively on the relative
political power of the class impacted by any given law, making it a "one
way" form of review that can only be invoked by situation-specific
powerless classes of persons who are the targets of legislative animus. The
remaining factors, coupled with the Adarand line of precedent, can be
abstracted in a way that is focused on the nature of the classification
employed rather than the specific class impacted by any given law, making
the intermediate or strict scrutiny that follows from application of those
precedents something that can be invoked, in the first instance, not only by
classes of persons that are relatively politically powerless, but rather by
anyone who is classified using suspect or quasi-suspect criteria.
This Article concludes that announcing heightened scrutiny in such a
case-which under the consistency principle would benefit gays and
lesbians in battles over marriage equality, parenting rights, and the likewould present a particularly appealing vehicle to the Court's center,
represented by Justice Kennedy, whose jurisprudence to date
simultaneously demonstrates support for gay rights and hostility toward
affirmative action policies.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Overview ofEqual ProtectionJurisprudence
Modem-day equal protection jurisprudence is characterized by tiered
levels of scrutiny, whereby the level of scrutiny varies depending upon the
classification involved or the right affected. The tiered approach was
described by the Court in its 1988 decision Clark v. Jetern as follows:
In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,... we apply
different levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications. At a
minimum, a statutory classification must be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose. Classifications based on race or
national origin, and classifications affecting fundamental rights, are
given the most exacting scrutiny. Between these extremes of
rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate

27. 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
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scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.28
Under the tiered approach, the higher the level of scrutiny, the greater the
judicial scrutiny of both the legislative end sought to be accomplished by
the law and the means for achieving that end. At the lowest level of
review-rational basis-the end need only be legitimate (and need not
even be the real rationale for the law, but merely a hypothesized one), and
the means employed to achieve that end need only be "rationally related"
to achieving it, allowing for substantial over- and under-inclusiveness. 29
At the opposite extreme-strict scrutiny-the end must be compelling and
the means employed to achieve that end "narrowly tailored" so as to
eliminate over- or under-inclusiveness. 30 Between the two is intermediate
scrutiny, which requires an "important" government interest and a means
that is "substantially related" to achieving that end.3
Much of the complexity of modem-day equal protection jurisprudence
can be traced to two competing forces that have shaped it: a general desire
on the part of the Supreme Court to distance itself from the Lochner32
era-a period in which the Court was subject to heavy criticism for
interfering with and second-guessing the legislative process through an
aggressive interpretation of its powers under the Due Process Clausescoupled with a desire to maintain a safety valve that allows the Court to
step in and strike legislation down that targets a vulnerable group.
The roots of these two competing forces appear in the Court's 1938
post-Lochner decision in United States v. CaroleneProducts Co.,3 where
the Court-after rejecting a substantive due process challenge to a federal
statute-describes the similarly deferential "rational basis" standard
applicable to equal protection challenges:
The . . equal
protection
clause ... does
not
compel . .
Legislatures to prohibit all like evils, or none. A Legislature may hit
at an abuse which it has found, even though it has failed to strike at
another.

28.
29.
U.S. 93,
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 461 (citations omitted).
See FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-16 (1993); Vance v. Bradley, 440
108 (1979).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
See Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators.34
The Court subsequently reiterated the deferential nature of its default level
of equal protection scrutiny in Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc. :
The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one,
admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may
be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different
remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem
which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may
select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting
the others. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no
further than the invidious discrimination. 3 6
Yet, in what has been termed "the most celebrated footnote in
constitutional law,"37 the Carolene Products Court set forth an important
caveat:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or
racial minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be

34.
35.
36.
37.
(1982).

Id. at 151-52.
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Id. at 489 (citations omitted).
See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087, 1087
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relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
But how has the Court come to decide that certain classifications are
subject to intermediate or strict scrutiny, while others are entitled merely
to rational basis review? Moreover, how is it that a caveat in Carolene
Products referring to the possibility of heightened scrutiny for
discrimination against "discrete and insular minorities" has come to result
in the application of heightened judicial scrutiny for discrimination against
whites? Finally, if heightened scrutiny is inapplicable, does rational basis
review ever result in the invalidation of legislation, and if so, when? The
answers to these questions are provided, respectively, by the Frontiero,
Adarand, and Moreno lines of equal protection precedent.
B. Development of the Frontiero, Adarand, and Moreno Lines of
Precedent
1. FactorsRequired to Accord HeightenedScrutiny: The Frontiero
Line ofPrecedent
The roots of what today is referred to as strict scrutiny grew out of
dictum in a pair of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court during World
War II involving a curfew for and the internment of persons of Japanese
ancestry. Although the measures were upheld by the Court, the decisions
used language suggesting that equal protection claims involving race
would be subject to more rigorous scrutiny than run-of-the-mill equal
protection claims. The Court wrote that "racial discriminations are in most
circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited," 39 and that "all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect" and thus that "courts must subject them to the most
rigid scrutiny." 40
Yet, it was not until the 1960s that this promising dictum bore fruit,
with the Court citing it in both its 1964 decision McLaughlin v. Florida,41
declaring unconstitutional a law prohibiting interracial cohabitation, and
its 1967 decision Loving v. Virginia,42 declaring unconstitutional a law
prohibiting interracial marriage. In McLaughlin, the Court began to sketch

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Carolene Products,304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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out the heightened level of review the Court would employ for racial
classifications, specifically distinguishing Lee Optical and holding that a
racial classification "will be upheld only if it is necessary, and not merely
rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy,' a
standard that the Court reiterated in Loving." The Court would for some
time vacillate in the language it used to describe the strength of the state
interest-a vacillation to which it attributed no importance 45-and would
ultimately rephrase the standard as one requiring that it be narrowly
tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.46
With cases such as McLaughlin and Loving making clear that strict
scrutiny could result in the invalidation of laws challenged on equal
protection grounds, litigants began to contend that strict scrutiny should be
available to challenge laws targeting other disadvantaged groups, such as
aliens, the poor, women, the elderly, the mentally retarded, and children
born out of wedlock. In a series of cases decided in the 1970s and the
1980s, the Court accepted the claims of some of these groups and rejected
others. In so doing, the Court set forth a series of factors designed to
distinguish those classifications that, like race or national origin, merited
heightened equal protection scrutiny.
The Court first considered expanding the number of groups entitled to
strict scrutiny in its 1971 decision Graham v. Richardson,4 7 where it
addressed the question whether laws discriminating against aliens were
subject to strict scrutiny. The Court-with little analysis-concluded that
they were, quoting from the caveat contained in Carolene Products'
famous footnote and concluding that "[a]liens as a class are a prime
example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened
judicial solicitude is appropriate." 4 8
Two years later, in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,49 the Court rejected an argument that a law discriminating
against the poor was subject to heightened scrutiny. Without citation to
any cases, the Court concluded that the poor, which it described as a
"large, diverse, and amorphous class," has "none of the traditional indicia
of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected
to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 194, 196.
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 n.9 (1973).
See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion).
403 U.S. 365 (1971).
Id. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process."5 0
Rodriguez thus appeared to identify two considerations-a group's
history of discrimination and its lack of political power-as relevant in
determining whether or not to apply heightened scrutiny to laws
discriminating against that group.
Less than two months later, a plurality of the Court-in Frontiero v.
Richardson5 '-concluded that strict scrutiny was required for laws that
discriminate against women. The Court identified six considerations that it
believed, like race and national origin, made strict scrutiny appropriate.
First, it noted the history of discrimination against women was comparable
to that of African Americans.52 Second, it noted the "high visibility" of a
person's sex. Third, while acknowledging that women as a group were
not "a small and powerless minority," it nonetheless took note of their
relative lack of political power. 54 Fourth, it noted that "sex, like race and
national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the
accident of birth."55 Fifth, it differentiated sex from non-suspect statusessuch as intelligence or physical ability-on the ground that it "frequently
bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society."5 6 Finally, it
took note of the fact that Congress had enacted legislation designed to
combat sex discrimination, and held that the fact that a coequal branch of
government has concluded that sex discrimination is invidious is a
relevant consideration in deciding whether to accord a class heightened
scrutiny.57 Although only a plurality opinion and thus arguably offering
limited precedential value, 8 nearly all of the factors have been reaffirmed
in some fashion in subsequent Court decisions.
Three years later, in 1976, the Court issued a pair of decisions rejecting
arguments that discrimination on the basis of age or illegitimacy should be
subject to strict scrutiny. The Court--citing Rodriguez-concluded in
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia5 9 that, unlike those
discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, the elderly

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 28.
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Id. at 684-85.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 686 & n.17.
Id.
Id
Id. at 687-88.
See Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1010-11 (D. Nev. 2012).
427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
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have not experienced "'a history of purposeful unequal treatment' or been
subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics
not truly indicative of their abilities."60 Furthermore, citing Carolene
Products, the Court noted that "old age does not define a 'discrete and
insular' group" because it "marks a stage that each of us will reach if we
live out our normal span." 6 1 The Murgia Court seemed to reinforce three
of the Frontierofactors: the absence of a history of discrimination, the fact
that old age is related to ability to perform or contribute to society, and the
fact that age is mutable and thus old age is a classification that nearly all
persons will eventually experience.
With respect to illegitimacy, the Court acknowledged in Mathews v.
Lucas 62 that the status was in some ways analogous to race and national
origin; it is "not within the control of the illegitimate individual"-thus
making it effectively immutable-and that status "bears no relation to the
individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society." 6 3 But it
contrasted illegitimacy with race and sex-the latter of which the Court
assumed to be subject to strict scrutiny based on the plurality opinion in
Frontiero -on the ground that it "does not carry an obvious badge," and
as a result of that invisibility, the illegitimate did not experience the
"pervasive[] . . . historic[al] legal and political discrimination" experienced

by women and African Americans.65 Yet, despite the Court's
unwillingness to declare illegitimacy a suspect class, it nonetheless didin cases decided both prior and subsequent to Mathews-declare
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds laws that discriminated on
the basis of illegitimacy. The Court, while not specifying the level of
scrutiny it was applying, focused on the unjustness of laws that target a
status over which the illegitimate child lacks control, thus focusing on
effective immutability. 6 6 Moreover, the Mathews Court acknowledged that
the standard to be applied in evaluating such laws was "not a toothless
one," 67 and in subsequent cases, the Court acknowledged that laws

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
406 U.S.
67.

Id at 313 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28).
Id, at 313-14.
427 U.S. 495 (1976).
Id. at 505.
See id. at 506.
Id. at 506.
See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769-70 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
164, 175-76 (1972).
Mathews, 427 U.S. at 510.
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discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy were entitled to "somewhat
heightened review." 68
In the final days of 1976, the Court in Craig v. Boren69 once again
revisited the question regarding equal protection scrutiny for laws that
discriminate on the basis of sex. In the intervening years since Frontiero,
the Court had decided several other equal protection challenges based on
sex, but had disposed of them without definitively resolving the standard
of review.70 Moreover, Craig differed from Frontiero: the discrimination
complained about in Craig directly targeted men, not women. The Court
for the first time announced what has since come to be known as
intermediate scrutiny. Without citation to any particular cases (leading to a
charge by Justice Rehnquist in dissent that the test had been created out of
"thin air"),7 1 the Court wrote that "previous cases establish that
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 72
The Court did not discuss or revisit the factors it had identified in
Frontieroand built upon in subsequent cases, nor how those factors would
impact the determination whether to accord a group intermediate or strict
scrutiny.
Six years passed before the Court gave serious consideration to a claim
that a group should be accorded heightened equal protection scrutiny. In
1982, in Plyler v. Doe,73 the Court rejected the idea that laws
discriminating against illegal aliens in general were subject to heightened
scrutiny, noting that the status was the product of "voluntary action" in
illegally entering the country and thus could not be said to be immutable.74
However, with respect to laws discriminating against the children of
illegal aliens-at least those involving education-the Court viewed their
status, like that of illegitimate children, as effectively immutable, and
appeared to apply something akin to intermediate scrutiny.
The Court last engaged in an in-depth application of the factors for
determining whether a given classification was entitled to heightened
equal protection scrutiny in 1985 with City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

68. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).
69. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
70. See id. at 198 (collecting cases).
71. Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 197.
73. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
74. Id. at 219 n.19.
75. Id. at 218-30.
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Center Inc.,76 which addressed whether discrimination against the
mentally retarded should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. In deciding
that it should not be, the Court addressed and refined many of the factors
set forth in its earlier cases.77 The Court first acknowledged that mental
retardation is an immutable characteristic, but that-unlike race or sex-it
does relate to their ability to perform.78 Next, the Court noted the great
deal of federal and state legislation enacted to protect the mentally
retarded, which the Court viewed as a sign that the mentally retarded are
not politically powerless.7 9 As such, the Cleburne Court effectively
nullified the sixth Frontiero factor, which viewed the enactment of antidiscrimination legislation by a coequal branch as further evidence of a
group's suspect nature.o The Court went on to refine what it means to be
"politically powerless," indicating that it does not mean "powerless to
assert direct control over the legislature," but instead that the group has
"no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers."81 Finally, the Court
relied on a consideration first noted by the Rodriguez Court: the fact that
the group was "large and amorphous" militated against according them
heightened scrutiny.82
The following year, in Lyng v. Castillo, the Court gave short shrift to
a claim that discrimination against "close relatives" should be subject to
heightened scrutiny. While short on analysis, the opinion is salient because
it reorganized the factors in a way that presented some of them in the
disjunctive. The Lyng Court thus identified the three relevant inquiries as
(1) whether the group has suffered a history of discrimination; (2) whether
the group exhibits "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics
that define them as a discrete group"; and (3) whether they are either a
minority or politically powerless. 84
The Court's 1988 decision in Clark v. Jeter85 -involving
discrimination on the basis of legitimacy-marked the last time that the
Court formally announced a heightened level of scrutiny under the equal
protection clause for a previously unrecognized group. As with Craig,
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78.
79.
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81.
82.
83.
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85.

473 U.S. 432 (1985).
See id.
See id. at 442-43.
See id. at 443-45.
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973).
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added).
See id. at 445-46.
477 U.S. 635, 641 (1986).
Id. at 638. Accord Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987).
486 U.S. 456 (1988).
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however, the Court did not engage in any sort of analysis of the factors
identified in its earlier cases, but simply characterized its earlier decisions
as standing for the proposition that intermediate scrutiny was the
appropriate standard.
Since its decision in Lyng, the Court has rarely mentioned the relevant
factors for according a group heightened scrutiny, and when it has done
so, they have only been mentioned in passing,87 as the Court in a majority
opinion has not in any subsequent case analyzed a claim for heightened
class-based equal protection scrutiny.8 8 As will be shown in the section
that follows, this silence on the Court's part starting in the late 1980s can
be directly tied to the rise of the "consistency" line of precedent that took
root at the same time.
2. The Rise of the Consistency Requirement: The Adarand Line of
Precedent
In terms, the Equal Protection Clause appears to be neutral and of
broad application, providing that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 89 However, the
Clause itself was part of a series of amendments to the U.S. Constitution
enacted with the specific purpose of protecting the recently emancipated
slaves, and in the first decision interpreting it, the Court in 1873 suggested
that it not only was limited to claims of racial discrimination, but further
that it operated in a one-way fashion so as to protect only African
Americans:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by
way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account
of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this
provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that
emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application
to any other. 90

86. Seeid.at461.
87. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293-94 (2004); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 83 (2000); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993).
88. Justice Scalia mentioned the factors in a 1996 dissent in which he suggested that sex should
be downgraded to rational basis review on the theory that women-who constitute a majority of the
electorate-cannot reasonably be described as a discrete and insular minority unable to employ the
political process. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
90. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
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With regard to the first suggested limitation, history would show, as
Justice Rehnquist would later note, that the "Court has proved Mr. Justice
Miller a bad prophet with respect to nonracial classification." 91 With
regard to the second suggested limitation, seven years later, in Strauder v.
West Virginia,92 the Court, in declaring unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds a statute excluding African Americans from grand and
petit juries, indicated-albeit in dicta-that the Clause would not
necessarily operate in a one-way fashion, at least if whites were in the
minority in a given jurisdiction:
If in those States where the coloredpeople constitute a majority of
the entire population a law should be enacted excluding all white
men from jury service, thus denying to them the privilege of
participating equally with the blacks in the administration of justice,
we apprehend no one would be heard to claim that it would not be a
denial to white men of the equal protection of the laws. Nor if a law
should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen, would
there be any doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of the
amendment. 9 3
Of course, this question was for most of U.S. history a theoretical one,
since every law the Court confronted until the 1970s involved
discrimination againstAfrican Americans. 9 4 But in 1978, the Court for the
first time confronted the question whether a race-based affirmative action
policy benefiting racial minorities was to be subjected to the same strict
scrutiny applied to laws that invidiously discriminated against them. The
Court, in Regents of University of Californiav. Bakke, 95 declared unlawful
a medical school's affirmative action policy under which sixteen of one
hundred seats were reserved for racial minorities. The Court could not
agree on a rationale, but the opinion penned by Justice Powellannouncing the judgment of the Court-declared that such classifications
should be subject to strict scrutiny, reasoning that "[t]he guarantee of
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual
and something else when applied to a person of another color." 9 6 Justice

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 178 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100 U.S. 303 (1880).
Id at 308 (emphasis added).
See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-18 (1995).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 289-90.
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Powell's opinion in Bakke was thus the first opinion in which the concept
of "consistency" had been suggested outside of dictum.
In Bakke, four Justices avoided the equal protection issue altogether,
deciding the case on statutory grounds, 97 while the remaining four Justices
indicated that the application of strict scrutiny to a law discriminating
against whites was inconsistent with the factors for according heightened
scrutiny set forth in its earlier cases. These same four Justices noted that
whites as a class are "'not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process."' 98 Justice Powell
acknowledged that many of the Court's decisions had considered factors
such as "discreteness and insularity," but concluded that these
considerations were relevant to deciding "whether or not to add new types
of classifications to the list of 'suspect' categories." 99 In Justice Powell's
view, racial and ethnic classifications were sui generis, and thus subject to
strict scrutiny "without regard to these additional characteristics.",o
It was not until 1989 in City ofRichmond v. JA. Croson Co.101 that five
Justices signed onto opinions declaring that race-based affirmative action
policies benefiting racial minorities were to be subjected to the same strict
scrutiny applied to laws that invidiously discriminated against them, and
not until 1995 in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Penal0 2 that the Court
made clear that this standard applied not only to equal protection claims
brought against the states, but also those brought against the federal
government. Yet, in the intervening years, there were a number of
developments in equal protection jurisprudence outside of race that
foreshadowed the application of strict scrutiny to all race-based
affirmative action policies.
First, as indicated above, in 1976, the Court announced for the first
time in Craig v. Boren,' 03 that laws discriminating on the basis of sex were
to be subject to intermediate scrutiny. However, Craigwas a case in which
men, not women, were bringing the constitutional challenge on the ground

97. Id. at 408-11 (Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist, J.J., and Burger, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
98. Id. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackman, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
99. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
102. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
103. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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that the law disadvantaged men. Accordingly, in Craig, the Court in effect
adopted the principle of consistency sub silentio, at least so far as sex was
concerned. Writing in dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted the inconsistency
between the Court's rationale for applying heightened scrutiny to laws
disfavoring women in Frontiero and its decision to accord heightened
scrutiny to laws disfavoring men:
Most obviously unavailable to support any kind of special scrutiny
in this case, is a history or pattern of past discrimination, such as
was relied on by the plurality in Frontiero to support its invocation
of strict scrutiny. There is no suggestion in the Court's opinion that
males in this age group are in any way peculiarly disadvantaged,
subject to systematic discriminatory treatment, or otherwise in need
of special solicitude from the courts.1 04
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,05 a post-Craig, preCroson decision, the Court reaffirmed the consistency principle (without
so labeling it), emphasizing that the fact that a law "discriminates against
males rather than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or
reduce the standard of review."'0 6 In turn, a plurality of the Court in a preCroson case cited Hogan in a race-based affirmative action case for the
general proposition that "the level of scrutiny does not change merely
because the challenged classification operates against a group that
historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination."107
The second intervening development occurred in 1985, when the Court
issued its decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 08 In
addition to its application of the Frontiero and other factors from its prior
cases, the Court also indicated another reason for declining to subject laws
discriminating against the mentally retarded to intermediate scrutiny:
It may be . . that legislation designed to benefit, rather than
disadvantage, the retarded would generally withstand examination
under a test of heightened scrutiny. . . . Even assuming that many of

these laws could be shown to be substantially related to an
important governmental purpose, merely requiring the legislature to

104.
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107.
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Id. at 219 (Rehquist, J., dissenting).
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
Id. at 723.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986).
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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justify its efforts in these terms may lead it to refrain from acting at
all. 109

Thus, the Cleburne Court seemed to take as given a general underlying
consistency principle that would require laws designed to benefit the
mentally retarded to be subjected to the same heightened scrutiny that they
were seeking in Cleburne to have applied to laws discriminating against
them.
Given the opinion of Justice Powell in Bakke and the assumption of
consistency underlying some of the Court's non-race equal protection
cases, the Court's 1989 decision in Croson requiring the application of
strict scrutiny to state affirmative action policies benefiting racial
minorities"o is perhaps somewhat less shocking than it first appears.
Nonetheless, like Justice Rehnquist in Craig, Justice Marshall, dissenting
in Croson, noted how the decision was at odds with the Court's decisions
setting forth the factors for deciding whether or not to accord heightened
scrutiny to a class."' It is thus not surprising that the Frontiero line of
cases went dormant around this same time, since the two lines of
precedent are-at least as presently configured--difficult to reconcile.
Still, it was possible even after Croson for the Court to limit the scope
of its consistency principle in two distinct ways. First, Croson involved an
equal protection clause challenge against a state. Because the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply against
the federal government, litigants must instead invoke the "equal
protection" principle that the Court has found embodied within the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 112 Because the sources of
protection differ, it remained possible to subject them to different
standards. Second, the facts of Croson itself were akin to the hypothetical
jurisdiction described by the Court over 100 years earlier in Strauder:
Even were we to accept a reading of the guarantee of equal
protection under which the level of scrutiny varies according to the
ability of different groups to defend their interests in the
representative process, heightened scrutiny would still be
appropriate in the circumstances of this case. One of the central

109. Id. at 444.
110. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (plurality opinion);
id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. See id at 553-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Ironically, Justice Rehnquist quietly joined the
majority opinion.
112. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954).
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arguments for applying a less exacting standard to "benign" racial
classifications is that such measures essentially involve a choice
made by dominant racial groups to disadvantage themselves....
In this case, blacks constitute approximately 50% of the
population of the city of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the
city council are held by blacks. The concern that a political majority
will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on
unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to
militate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial
scrutiny in this case.' 13
Given this unusual factual scenario, it was thus possible in future cases to
limit Croson to the situation in which a racial classification is made and
the race negatively impacted by the classification is in the minority in the
particular jurisdiction in which it is implemented.
The Court briefly flirted with the first distinction, holding just one year
later in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC 1 l4 that benign racial
classifications imposed by the federal government were subject only to
intermediate scrutiny."'5 But just five years later, the Court in Adarand
overturned Metro Broadcasting, emphasizing not only the newly coined
principle of "consistency"-that the "standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
benefited by a particular classification" 1 6 -but also the newly coined
principle of "congruence"- that "'Equal protection analysis in the Fifth
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth
Amendment.""' 7 Moreover, unlike Croson, the affirmative action policy
at issue was federal, and thus enacted in a jurisdiction in which African
Americans and the other groups benefiting from the policy were squarely
in the minority. Thus, by 1995, the consistency principle was firmly rooted
in equal protection jurisprudence, at least with respect to sex and race
discrimination.

113.
114.
(1995).
115.
116.
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Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96.
497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224
See id. at 564-65.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494).
Id. at 224 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)).
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3. Rational Basis "Plus"Review: The Moreno Line of Precedent
In 1973-the same year that the Court issued its decision in Frontiero
setting forth the factors for determining when to apply heightened equal
protection scrutiny, the Court in U.S. Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno' also considered an equal protection challenge to the
constitutionality of an amendment to a federal statute, the Food Stamp
Act, which rendered ineligible to participate in the program any household
containing an individual who is unrelated to any other member of the
household. On its face, the Act created two rather neutral-looking classes
of persons, those living in "households all of whose members are related
to one another," and those living "in households containing one or more
members who are unrelated to the rest."ll9 Yet, the Court noted, lurking in
the background of the Act was an effort to target a particular group,
specifically, "hippies" and "hippie communes." 1 2 0
It would have been quite a stretch for the Moreno Court to apply the
Frontiero factors and conclude that hippies were a suspect class. The
Court did not attempt to do so, nor did it purport to be applying anything
more than rational basis scrutiny. 12 1 Yet, after reciting the evidence that
the purpose of the amendment was to target hippies and hippie communes,
the Court wrote:
The challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by
reference to this congressional purpose. For if the constitutional
conception of "equal protection of the laws" means anything, it
must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest. 22
The Court then proceeded to declare the law unconstitutional, 123 applying
what can perhaps be referred to as an aggressive or heightened form of
rational basis review. Indeed, even the concurring opinion-which agreed
with the result in the case-acknowledged that the law would pass
traditional rational basis review.1 24
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413 U.S. 528 (1973).
Id. at 529.
Id. at 534.
See id. at 533-34.
Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
Id. at 538.
See id. at 542-44 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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To be sure, Moreno did not mark the first instance in which the Court
purported to apply rational basis review to an equal protection claim but in
truth applied something more substantial. In the two years immediately
preceding Moreno, the Court issued a pair of decisions, Reed v. Reedl 25
and Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Insurance Co.,1 2 6 which declared
unconstitutional laws discriminating, respectively, on the basis of sex and
legitimacy. In each case, the Court purported to apply only rational basis
review 12-which virtually always results in upholding the validity of the
law under the deferential standard articulated in cases such as Carolene
Products and Lee Optical-yet nonetheless declared the laws to violate
the equal protection clause. In fact, Weber was itself preceded three years
earlier by Levy v. Louisiana,128 in which the Court did much the same
thing with respect to illegitimacy discrimination. One might thus contend
that this marked an era in which the Court more generally sought to
transform rational basis review into something more substantial and less
deferential than the test articulated in CaroleneProducts and Lee Optical.
Yet, as I have remarked elsewhere, 129 what distinguishes the
heightened rational basis review in cases such as Reed and Weber on the
one hand from Moreno on the other is the subsequent trajectory of the
decisions. Reed and Weber are what I have described as "transitional
rational basis plus" cases, in which the Court: mouths the language of
rational basis while in fact applies what appears to be some form of
heightened scrutiny; subsequently explicitly holds that laws discriminating
on that basis are subject to heightened scrutiny; and re-characterizes its
earlier decisions as actually applying heightened scrutiny despite their use
of rational basis parlance.130 Both Reed and Weber followed this pattern,
with the Court eventually subjecting sex and illegitimacy classifications to
intermediate scrutiny and so characterizing the earlier decisions.131
Moreno, by contrast, is not a "transitional rational basis plus" case. It
was the first and last time that the Court addressed a claim involving
discrimination against "hippies" and "hippie communes." The Court did
not go on to subsequently hold that "hippies" are a suspect class (or, in

125.
126.
127.
128.

404 U.S. 71(1971).
406 U.S. 164 (1972).
See Weber, 406 U.S. at 175-76; Reed, 404 U.S. at 75-76.
391 U.S. 68 (1968).

129. See PETER NICOLAS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION

267, 282-83 (2013).
130. See id at 267.
131. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-84 (1973).
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post-Adarand lingo, that "hippiness" or "hippie orientation" is a suspect
classification). Rather, Moreno is what I have described as a "fleeting
rational basis plus case," in which the Court applies an intermittent form
of heightened rational basis review based on the specific facts of the case,
namely, what it sees as a temporary breakdown in the political process
whereby a law appears to be enacted for the purpose of harming a
politically unpopular group, albeit a group which does not merit
heightened scrutiny under the Frontiero factors. 132

In his book The Constitutional Underclass: Gays, Lesbians, and the
Failure of Class-Based Equal Protection, Evan Gerstmann contends that
the Court decided to create intermediate scrutiny and to re-characterize its
earlier decisions striking down laws discriminating on the basis of sex and
legitimacy as applying such scrutiny for the specific purpose of returning
rational basis review to its Carolene Products-Lee Optical roots and
preventing litigants from citing cases such as Reed, Levy, and Weber for
the more general proposition that rational basis review is not toothless but
in fact substantial. 13 3
Gerstmann may well be correct about the intent of the Court, or at least
some of its members, in acknowledging intermediate scrutiny, and
subsequent to the creation of intermediate scrutiny in 1976, Moreno lay
dormant for some time. Yet the development of the consistency line of
precedent in the second half of the 1980s, whose tension with the
Frontiero line of cases halted the development of that line of cases,
simultaneously resulted in the reemergence of Moreno's "fleeting rational
basis plus" standard of review.
Moreno first resurfaced in the Court's 1985 decision Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 134 As noted above, Cleburne marked the last
time that the Court engaged in an in-depth analysis of the factors that
determine whether or not to apply heightened equal protection scrutiny. It
also was a case that provided an early signal of the establishment of the
consistency principle, with its assumption that applying heightened
scrutiny to laws discriminating against the mentally retarded would result
in the application of that same level of scrutiny to laws designed to benefit
the mentally retarded.1 35

132. See NICOLAS, supra note 129, at 282-83.
133. See EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE
FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 42-44, 52-53 (1999).

134. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
135.

See id. at 443-45.
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Yet, after rejecting the application of anything greater than rational
basis review to the law at issue, the Cleburne Court proceeded to declare
the law unconstitutional as applied. The Court began its analysis by
quoting Moreno for the proposition that "some objectives-such as 'a bare
... desire to harm a politically unpopular group'-are not legitimate state
interests."1 36 The Court then applied a level of scrutiny to the law, akin to
Moreno, that lacked the deference normally associated with traditional
rational basis review.'3 7 Moreover, like Moreno, the Court did not
characterize the classification at issue in the case as suspect or quasisuspect. 138
This departure from traditional rational basis review in Cleburne was
noted by Justice Marshall, who penned a separate opinion. Justice
Marshall characterized Moreno as an "intermediate review decision[]
masquerading in rational-basis language,"1 3 9 and similarly characterized
the majority's opinion in Cleburne:
[T]he Court does not label its handiwork heightened scrutiny, and
perhaps the method employed must hereafter be called "second
order" rational-basis review rather than "heightened scrutiny." But
however labeled, the rational basis test invoked today is most
assuredly not the rational-basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical . .
and [its] progeny.140
Specifically, Justice Marshall identified three ways the analysis in
Cleburne differed from traditional rational basis review: (1) it focused on
the underinclusiveness of the law, whereas traditional rational basis review
permits substantial underinclusiveness; (2) it looked for evidence in the
record to support the alleged rationale for the law, even though traditional
rational basis review does not require support in the record; and (3) it
appeared to place the burden on the government, whereas with traditional
rational basis the burden is on the challenger.1 4 1 Justice Marshall went on
to articulate the twin dangers associated with the majority's approach:
The suggestion that the traditional rational-basis test allows this sort
of searching inquiry creates precedent for this Court and lower
courts to subject economic and commercial classifications to similar

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 446-47 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
See id. 447.
See id.
Id. at 459 n.4 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id at 458.
See id at 458-59.
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and searching "ordinary" rational-basis review-a small and
regrettable step back toward the days of Lochner v. New York.
Moreover, by failing to articulate the factors that justify today's
"second order" rational-basis review, the Court provides no
principled foundation for determining when more searching inquiry
is to be invoked. Lower courts are thus left in the dark on this
important question, and this Court remains unaccountable for its
decisions employing, or refusing to employ, particularly searching
scrutiny.142
Consistent with Justice Marshall's critique, the Court, in subsequent
cases-at least in subsequent cases in which it was not inclined to overturn
the law at issue-rejected arguments by litigants that Moreno and
Cleburne established a more rigorous standard of review, instead
describing them as a mere application of the traditional rational basis
test. 143
C. At the Crossroads:The Gay Rights Cases
In 1985-the same year in which the Court issued its opinion in
Cleburne rejecting intermediate scrutiny for laws targeting the mentally
retarded while simultaneously applying Moreno-style rational basis review
to strike down the law-the Court declined to grant certiorari in a case
raising the question whether discrimination against gay or bisexual
persons violated the equal protection guarantee. 14 4 Justice Brennan, joined
by Justice Marshall, penned a dissent from the denial of certiorari, noting
that such classifications should be subject to heightened scrutiny because
the targeted group is an insular minority that has suffered from a history of
discrimination and also is politically powerless, at least once its members
are open about their sexual orientation. 145 The following year, in Bowers v.
Hardwick,14 6 the Court rejected a substantive due process challenge to a
sodomy law as applied to gays and lesbians, but in a footnote made clear
that it was not addressing any possible equal protection challenge to the
law. 147

142. Id. at 459-60 (internal citations omitted).
143. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001); Lyng v. Int'l Union,
UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 n.8 (1988); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1986).
144. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
145. See id. at 1014 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
146. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
147. See id. at 196 n.8.
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It would not be until a decade later, in 1996, that the Court, in Romer v.
Evans,14 8 would have the opportunity to consider an equal protection
challenge to a law targeting gays and lesbians. At issue in the case was the
constitutionality of Amendment 2 to Colorado's Constitution, a voter
initiative that both repealed existing state and local laws regarding nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and prohibited the future
enactment of such laws.1 4 9 By this point in time, the consistency principle
was firmly established-Adarand had been decided the previous yearand thus the factors identified by the Frontiero Court seemed no longer
applicable. After all, why demand that a group suffer a history of
discrimination and be politically powerless before extending heightened
scrutiny to laws discriminating against that group only to turn around and
apply the same level of scrutiny to laws discriminating against its
counterpart, who not only lacked either of those qualities but used its
extensive political power to impose that history of discrimination?
Thus, rather than invoking the Frontiero factors to determine whether
discrimination against gays and lesbians was subject to intermediate or
strict scrutiny, the Court instead first stated that "laws of the kind now
before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.", 5 0 Next, it cited
Moreno's holding that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group
does not constitute a legitimate government interest. 15 Finally, the Court
declared Amendment 2 unconstitutional on the ground that it failed
rational basis review, despite a number of rationales for the law-such as
protecting the associational rights of others and preserving resources to
fight more serious types of discrimination l-that
would likely have
sufficed under traditional rational basis review. Writing in dissent, Justice
Scalia not only explained why the law passed traditional rational basis
review, but also took issue with the Court's characterization of gays and
lesbians as "politically unpopular," contending that the group "enjoys
enormous influence in American media and politics" and had the support
of forty-six percent of those who voted on Amendment 2 despite
comprising no more than four percent of the population. 53

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
See id. at 623-24.
Id. at 634.
See id. at 634-35.
See id. at 635-36.
Id. at 642-43, 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Had Romer represented a sporadic instance of discrimination against a
group that otherwise failed to satisfy the factors the Court had previously
identified for applying heightened scrutiny, it would have fit nicely in the
Moreno-Cleburne line of cases as an instance of "fleeting rational basis
plus" review. Yet Romer was preceded by a history of discrimination
against gays and lesbians, including the presence of criminal sodomy laws
that were still on the books in many states. Moreover, Romer was followed
by an aggressive campaign to prohibit same-sex marriage by means not
only of statutory enactments-such as the federal Defense of Marriage
Act-but also numerous amendments to state constitutions banning samesex marriage and similar legal unions.1 5 4 Indeed, in the years since Romer
was decided, the Court-or at least some portion of it-has thus far twice
invoked the Moreno-Cleburne-Romer line of cases as a basis for striking
down a law discriminating against gays and lesbians.'55
First, in Lawrence v. Texas,1 5 6 the Court once again considered a
constitutional challenge to laws criminalizing sodomy. But the law at issue
in Lawrence differed from that at issue in Bowers. While the latter was
ostensibly applicable to all, including heterosexuals, the former applied
only to same-sex sodomy. 57 Thus, Lawrence presented not only an
opportunity for the Court to reconsider its substantive due process holding
in Bowers, but also a clear equal protection challenge. Yet the Court, while
describing the equal protection argument as a "tenable" one, opted instead
to reconsider and overturn its decision in Bowers. 58
Although the majority in Lawrence side-stepped the equal protection
argument, Justice O'Connor-who was part of the majority in Bowers and
did not wish to overrule that case's substantive due process holdingpenned a separate concurring opinion declaring the sodomy law at issue
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. 9 Yet, like the Court in
Romer, she did not consider the question whether intermediate or strict
scrutiny was applicable. Rather, Justice O'Connor cited Moreno,
Cleburne, and Romer as standing for the proposition that "[w]hen a law
exhibits . . . a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have

applied a more searchingform of rational basis review to strike down

154.

155.
(2013).
156.
157.
158.
159.

See generally NICOLAS & STRONG, supra note 4.

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
See id. at 562-64, 574-75.
See id. at 574-75, 578.
See id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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such laws under the Equal Protection Clause."l 6 0 She cabined the scope of
what she characterized as a heightened form of rational basis review,
noting that it is most likely to result in declaring unconstitutional laws that
"inhibit[] personal relationships."' 6 ' Justice Scalia, while disagreeing with
Justice O'Connor's opinion, characterized it as a heightened form of equal
protection scrutiny, noting that under the test as she articulated it, "laws
exhibiting a desire to harm a politically unpopular group are invalid even
though there may be a conceivable rational basis to support them."l 6 2
Most recently, in United States v. Windsor, 6 3 the Court once again
considered an equal protection challenge involving discrimination against
gays and lesbians, specifically, the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which
defines marriage as between a man and a woman and refuses to recognize
marriages validly entered into in states where same-sex marriage is lawful.
Yet the Court declined to affirm the decision on the same basis as the
Second Circuit, which applied the Frontiero factors to arrive at the
conclusion that gays and lesbians are a quasi-suspect class and thus laws
discriminating against them are subject to intermediate scrutiny.1 6 4 Rather,
the Court once again quoted Moreno's holding regarding a bare desire to
harm a politically unpopular group, as well as. its prior decision in
Romer.1 65 The Court then identified the harms DOMA inflicts on same-sex
couples and declared it unconstitutional.1 6 6 The Court did not, however,
consider the various rationales for DOMA to determine whether it was
sufficiently tailored to those rationales to survive rational basis,
intermediate, or strict scrutiny. Indeed, unlike the Moreno, Cleburne, and
Romer opinions, the Court in Windsor did not even purport to be applying
rational basis scrutiny, but was instead murky on exactly what level of
review it was applying, as Justice Scalia's dissent was quick to point
out.1

67

While Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor each delivered victories to the
gay-rights plaintiffs, the decisions suffer from the limitations Justice
Marshall identified in his separate opinion in Cleburne. Specifically, the
murkiness of the decisions has left lower courts "in the dark," and while

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
(2013).
165.
166.
167.

See id at 580 (emphasis added).
Id.
See id at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181-85 (2d Cir. 2012), affd, 133 S. Ct. 2675
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692-93.
Id. at 2693-96.
See id at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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this has resulted in some victories for proponents of gay rights, the Court's
failure to clearly state in any of these decisions that heightened scrutiny is
in play has resulted in some lower courts invoking traditional rational
basis principles to reject equal protection claims brought by gays and
lesbians.168
Moreover, with the Court having issued not one but three increasingly
murky equal protection decisions involving gay rights and set to issue yet
another decision in 2015,169 this line of cases-despite its repeated citation
to Moreno-is starting to look less like fleeting rational basis plus and
more like the transitional rational basis plus cases that ultimately resulted
in the establishment of intermediate scrutiny for laws discriminating on
the basis of sex and illegitimacy. The Court's willingness to make that
final step in the transition process may to some extent be hampered by
what appears to be an irreconcilable tension between the Frontiero and
Adarand lines of precedent. The remainder of this Article, through its
analysis of the constitutionality of gayffirmative action policies, seeks to
provide the Court with a roadmap for reconciling those precedents to make
the prospect of declaring sexual orientation to be a suspect or quasisuspect classification a realistic one.
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND TIERED SCRUTINY
A. Race-BasedAffirmative Action and Strict Scrutiny
Between the Court's 1978 decision in Bakke and its 2013 decision in
Fisher, the Court has in two different ways made it increasingly difficult
for public entities to engage in race-based affirmative action. First, it has
thus far identified only a handful of goals that satisfy strict scrutiny's
requirement that the governmental interest be compelling, while in the
meantime explicitly rejecting numerous others. Second, even when public
entities have sought to further those goals the Court has recognized as
compelling, strict scrutiny's requirement that the means used to
accomplish those goals be "narrowly tailored" to achieving those goalsincluding its requirement that the state actor consider race-neutral
alternatives and use race as a factor only when holistically evaluating

168. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir.
2004); Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997);
Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Haw. 2012).
169. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S.
Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-571).
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applicants-has significantly limited the circumstances under which a
race-based affirmative action policy will pass constitutional muster.
To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged only two
justifications for race-based affirmative action policies that satisfy strict
scrutiny's requirement that the government have a compelling interest for
drawing distinctions on the basis of race. First, a governmental entity can
implement an affirmative action policy as a remedy for past
discrimination. However, this form of remedial affirmative action is
narrowly circumscribed; the governmental entity seeking to implement the
policy cannot rely merely on general societal discrimination on the basis
of race. 17 0 Rather, such a remedial policy satisfies the compelling interest
prong of the strict scrutiny test only if the very governmentalactor seeking
to implement the policy was doing so as a remedy for past discrimination
that the entity itself engaged in, or based on a specific finding of private
discrimination within its jurisdiction of which a governmental entity was
effectively a passive participant.171 Moreover, to justify an affirmative
action policy on such a basis, there must be a "strong basis in evidence"
that the prior discrimination actually occurred.' 72 Second, at least in the
context of higher education, 73 a governmental entity can implement a
race-based affirmative action policy-without pointing to a prior specific
history of discrimination-on the ground that it contributes to the
attainment of a diverse student body from which educational benefits
flow. 174

In addition to its rejection of general societal discrimination as a
justification for implementing race-based affirmative action policies, the
Court has thus far rejected three other proposed justifications for such
policies. First, the Court has rejected the interest in "racial balancing," or
the interest in having a workforce or classroom whose racial mix tracks

170. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 731-32 (2007)
(plurality opinion); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1989) (plurality opinion); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274
(1986) (plurality opinion).
171. See Shaw, 517 U.S. at 910; Croson, 488 U.S. at 497-98; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76.
Moreover, where the latter is involved, the discrimination must be tied directly to the specific field or
profession in which the governmental actor wishes to implement the affirmative action policy and the
percentage of qualifiedminoritiesin the jurisdiction. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 497-98.
172. See Shaw, 517 U.S. at 909; Croson, 488 U.S. at 500, 510; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277.
173. The Court has suggested that the diversity rationale might not even suffice in the context of
elementary and secondary education. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 724-25.
174. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 325, 327-33 (2003).
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racial demographics.1 7 5 Second, the Court has rejected the "role model"
theory, whereby having people of specific races in given professionssuch as teaching-will allow them to serve as positive role models for
children of the same race.' 76 Third, the Court has held that admitting
minorities into specific professional programs, such as medicine, on the
theory that they will be more likely to provide needed services to minority
communities, is likewise not a compelling governmental interest. 7 1
Moreover, even when an affirmative action policy is enacted for the
purpose of remedying specific past discrimination or furthering the interest
in educational diversity, the policy must still satisfy the narrow tailoring
requirement. In both contexts, this requires a serious consideration of raceneutral alternatives.' Furthermore, in both contexts, the use of specific
quotas 79 or means that otherwise rely on race in a mechanical,
nonindividualized fashion-such as awarding a certain number of points
in an admissions scheme for being a member of a given race "-are
prohibited. Rather, race can only be a factor that is part of a highly
individualized analysis of each applicant.' 8 ' In addition, the Court has
indicated that race-based affirmative action policies must be time limited
and thus cannot be infinite in duration.1 82 Finally, the impact on nonminorities must be considered and minimized.' 83
In sum, as a direct result of the development of the consistency
principle in equal protection jurisprudence, it is now extremely difficult
for governmental entities to enact affirmative action policies-at least
race-based ones-that will pass constitutional muster.

175. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 729-30; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-30; Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
176. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 220 (1995); Croson, 488 U.S. at 49798; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76.
177. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310-11. The opinion is somewhat unclear on whether the Court did
not find this interest to be sufficiently compelling, or if instead the policy was not sufficiently narrowly
tailored to achieving that goal, or both.
178. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334, 339-43; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 23738; Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
179. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-08.
180. See ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 722-23; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 271-72 (2003); id. at 280 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
181. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-08.
182. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341-42; Croson, 488 U.S. at 510.
183. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
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B. Sex-Based Affirmative Action andIntermediate Scrutiny
In the post-Croson/Adarand era, some courts misinterpreted the
decisions as requiring that all affirmative action policies, without regard to
their nature, were subject to strict scrutiny, or at least viewed the issue as
unresolved. For example, although Craig held that sex discrimination is
subject only to intermediate scrutiny, some courts held or suggested that
Croson and Adarand, which were decided subsequent to Craig, effectively
modified Craig's holding, at least so far as affirmative action was
concerned. 18 4 In still other cases-involving a mix of race-based and sexbased affirmative action-courts did not apply a lower level of scrutiny to
the sex-based portions of the policies because both aspects satisfied the
higher strict scrutiny standard. 85
Yet with the passage of time, the overwhelming majority of federal
courts have held that it is not the nature of the government conduct at
issue-i.e., the fact that they are enacting an affirmative action policybut rather the nature of the classification employed therein that determines
the level of scrutiny to be applied.1 86 Several such courts have noted that,
although it seems odd that it is thus easier to enact affirmative action
policies benefiting women than racial minorities, such a result follows
logically from Croson.'8 1 Indeed, in his dissent in Adarand in which he
criticized the Court's principle of consistency, Justice Stevens explained
why he considered the holding to be such an anomaly when considered in
tandem with the Court's tiered levels of equal protection scrutiny:
[T]he Court may find that its new "consistency" approach to racebased classifications is difficult to square with its insistence upon
rigidly separate categories for discrimination against different
classes of individuals. For example, as the law currently stands, the
Court will apply "intermediate scrutiny" to cases of invidious

184. See, e.g., Builders Ass'n v. Cnty. of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2001); Brunet v. City
of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 403-04 (6th Cir. 1993); Milwaukee Cnty. Pavers Ass'n v. Fielder, 922 F.2d
419, 422 (7th Cir. 1991); Long v. City of Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1990).
185. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc. v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 713 F.3d
1187, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 2013); W. States Paving Co., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Transp., 407 F.3d
983, 990 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005).
186. See H.B. Rowe Co. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 2010); Dallas Fire Fighters Ass'n
v. City of Dallas, 150 F.3d 438, 441-42 & n.14 (5th Cir. 1998); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155,
182-83 (1st Cir. 1996); Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1579-80 (11th Cir. 1994);
Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1000-01 (3d Cir. 1993); Coral Constr.
Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 930-31 (9th Cir. 1991); Shuford v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 897 F.
Supp. 1535, 1550-51 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
187. See Seibels, 31 F.3d at 1579-80; ContractorsAss' ofE. Pa., 6 F.3d at 1001.
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gender discrimination and "strict scrutiny" to cases of invidious race
discrimination, while applying the same standard for benign
classifications as for invidious ones. If this remains the law, then
today's lecture about "consistency" will produce the anomalous
result that the Government can more easily enact affirmative-action
programs to remedy discrimination against women than it can enact
affirmative-action programs to remedy discrimination against
African-Americans-even though the primary purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause was to end discrimination against the former
slaves. 88
The consequences of subjecting sex-based affirmative action policies only
to intermediate scrutiny are significant. Because intermediate scrutiny is
less demanding, both in terms of the ends identified by the government
and the means employed for achieving those ends, governmental entities
have much greater flexibility in implementing such policies.
First, with respect to ends, lower courts have identified a number of
governmental interests that, while insufficient to justify race-based
affirmative action policies, suffice to justify sex-based ones. For example,
lower courts have held that general societal discrimination in the relevant
economic sector can suffice to justify such policies.' 89 Moreover, proof of
the prior discrimination need not satisfy the "strong basis in evidence"
standard, but instead need only be supported by evidence "'sufficient to
show that the preference rests on evidence-informed analysis rather than
on stereotypical generalizations."" 90 In addition, the evidence need not be
tied to the percentage of qualified women, but instead can be tied to
demographics.' 9 ' Finally, although racial balancing is not considered to be
a compelling governmental interest, sex balancing might be a sufficiently
important governmental interest strong enough to withstand intermediate
scrutiny.1 9 2
With respect to means, although not explicit in the decisions, given that
the courts permit reference to the percentage of women in the population
rather than the percentage of qualified women and are willing to consider

188. 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. See Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of S. Fla., Inc. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 122 F.3d 895, 910 (1lth
Cir. 1997); Seibels, 31 F.3d at 1580; Coral Constr. Co., 941 F.2d at 932. See also Concrete Works of
Colo., Inc. v. City of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting the precedent so holding, but
not deciding the issue).

190. Tippett, 615 F.3d at 242 (quoting Eng'g Contractors, 122 F.3d at 910); see Concrete Works,
321 F.3d at 959-60; ContractorsAss'n ofE. Pa., 6 F.3d at 1000-01).
191. See Seibels, 31 F.3d at 1582.
192. See Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 104-05 (4th Cir. 2011).
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general societal discrimination, "goals" that are somewhat more "quotalike" in nature-in that they are tied more directly to the percentage of
women in the general population-seem to be more likely to pass muster
than similar race-based goals. In other respects, courts have held
governmental entities to some similar requirements with respect to means,
including a requirement that the remedies be time-limited in nature. 193
Indeed, in the brief period of time in which the Supreme Court itself
applied intermediate scrutiny to race-based affirmative action policies, it
subjected them to two of the requirements associated with strict scrutiny:
that they be time-limited in nature and that the impact on non-minorities
be taken into account. 19 4
C. Non-Suspect Affirmative Action and Rational Basis Review
In litigation over gay rights on such issues as same-sex marriage, the
constitutionality of sodomy laws, and same-sex parenting, opponents of
gay rights have maintained a litigation stance that discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation is subject to nothing more than traditional
rational basis review. In some instances, lower courts have agreed, and
have accepted rather fanciful rationales for such laws that, at best, are
"rationally related" to achieving those goals in the CaroleneProducts-Lee
Optical sense. 195 If that indeed is the appropriate level of review for sexual
orientation discrimination, what sort of flexibility would governmental
entities have in establishing gayffirmative action policies? Although the
issue has not specifically come up in any reported cases, the bulk of
authority would suggest that governmental entities would have an
extraordinary amount of flexibility, both with respect to the justifications
for establishing such policies and the means employed for accomplishing
those goals.
As an initial matter, just as courts have held that sex-based affirmative
action policies are subject only to intermediate scrutiny, so too courts have
held, and commentators have noted, that affirmative action policies based
on non-suspect classifications-such as disability, veteran status, marital

193. See Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Dep't, 253 F.3d 1288, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001); Christian v.
United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 793, 812 (2000) (but this seems to be lumping it in with strict scrutiny for
race); Seibels, 31 F.3d at 1570.
194. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC., 497 U.S. 547, 594-97 (1990), overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
195. See generally, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 404-06 (6th Cir. 2014); Hernandez v.
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006); Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d
804 (11th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1111-19 (D. Haw. 2012).
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status, tribal status, language ability, and the like-are only subject to
rational basis review.196 Moreover, commentators such as Ruthann Robson
and David Strauss have noted that, under existing precedent, gayffirmative
action policies would only be subject to rational basis review. 197 This is
also consistent with the Supreme Court's Batsonl 9 8 line of cases-holding
that peremptory challenges based on race or sex will, respectively, fail
strict and intermediate scrutiny-while those based on non-suspect
grounds are subject to only rational basis review and are generally
permissible. 199
What, then, would such review allow for? Recall that rational basis
review is far more deferential than both strict and intermediate scrutiny,
requiring only "legitimate" government interests and means to accomplish
those interests that are "rationally related" to those interests. Moreover,
they need not even be the real motivations behind the law; hypothetical
rationales created post hoc suffice to uphold the constitutionality of such
laws. In addition, because the fit requirement is quite loose, such laws can
paint with a broad brush and thus can be overinclusive, underinclusive, or
both.
Consider the hypothetical medical school discussed in the introduction
that seeks to establish a quota-based system for increasing the number of
gay and transgender students at its school, with the stated goals of creating
role models for LGBT youth and improving the delivery of health services
to LGBT persons. Surely, both of those are "legitimate" governmental
interests, even if they are not "compelling" under strict scrutiny. After all,
youth of all stripes benefit from seeing people in positions of authority that
look like them, and surely members of the gay and transgender community
have unique medical concerns that are no doubt sometimes overlooked by
heterosexual practitioners (consider, as examples, such things as sexual
disease transmission and the need for hormone treatment and sexreassignment surgery).

196. See Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 871 & n.19 (3d Cir. 1994); Contractors Ass'n of E.
Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1001 (3d Cir. 1993); Krueth v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 38, 496
N.W.2d 829, 835-37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Ascher v. Kulongoski, 910 P.2d 372, 374 (Or. 1996);
Frank S. Ravitch, Creating Chaos in the Name of Consistency: Affirmative Action and the Odd Legacy

of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 101 DICK. L. REV. 281, 295-98 (1997); Donna ThompsonSchneider, Paved with Good Intentions: Affirmative Action After Adarand?, 31 TULSA L.J. 611, 634

(1996).
197. See Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV.
709, 719 n.48 (2002); David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 13.
198. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
199. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143-45 (1994).
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Indeed, three different lines of precedent provide support for the
conclusion that a "role model" rationale for a gayffirmative action policy
would pass rational basis review. First, there is case law holding that a law
which allows more senior non-Indian tenured teachers to be laid off before
laying off less senior Indian ones survives the rational basis review applied
to tribal status2 00 on the theory that doing so ensures the existence of role
models for Indian youth.20 1 Second, the Seventh Circuit has upheld a city
law granting benefits to cohabiting partners of same-sex but not oppositesex partners of school employees, on the theory that the school district has
an interest in providing LGBT youth with adult LGBT role models and
such a scheme helps to attract such individuals to work in the school
system.202 Finally, support for such a "role model" theory can be found in
the many lower court decisions upholding laws banning same-sex
marriage and same-sex parenting on the theory that the children of such
relationships will statistically be heterosexual and thus be in need of
heterosexual role models.2 03 Surely if that is so, then an affirmative action
policy based on a theory that LGBT youth need LGBT adult role models
should similarly satisfy rational basis review.
Moreover, a quota-based system that reserves a certain percentage of
the seats in the class for LGBT students should satisfy the fit prong of the
rational basis test, since it need only be rationally related to the goal.204 If a
governmental entity thinks that providing LGBT youth with LGBT role
models and increasing medical services to the LGBT community are
worthwhile goals, then surely producing doctors in rough proportion to
their percentage of the population is a "rational" way of furthering those
goals. Moreover, if, under intermediate scrutiny, it is permissible for
governmental entities to tie their admission and hiring goals to
demographics, then under rational basis review, it is undeniable that such a
method is permissible.
To be sure, the prospect of gayffirmative action policies springing up at
colleges and universities nationwide might be the nightmare of many

200. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
201. See Krueth, 496 N.W.2d at 835-37.
202. See Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604, 606-07 (7th Cir. 2001).
203. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 822 & n.19
(11th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1116 (D. Haw. 2012); Fla. Dep't of
Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) aff'd in relevant
part, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995); Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d 364, 370 (Mont. 2012) (Rice, J.,
concurring); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006); In re Opinion of the Justices, 530
A.2d 21, 25 (N.H. 1987).
204. See Robson, supranote 197.
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opponents of gay rights. Indeed, it might be the sort of trigger that would
spur at least some social conservatives to argue for heightened equal
protection scrutiny for sexual orientation discrimination.
III. SERIAL APPLICATION OF THE FRONTIERO AND ADARAND LINES OF
PRECEDENT

In this part, I sketch out what might be described as a traditional
approach to obtaining heightened scrutiny of a gayffirmative action policy.
In so doing, I assume the continued, independent vitality of both the
Frontiero and Adarand lines of precedent. I further assume that the path to
consistency follows the same path as did that for race and sex, namely,
that heightened scrutiny is first established in a case involving a law
discriminating against the minority group-in this instance gay and
transgender persons-and that in a subsequent case, an aggrieved
heterosexual seeks to obtain heightened scrutiny of a gayffirmative action
policy by invoking the precedent identifying sexual minorities as a suspect
class in tandem with the Adarand line of precedent.
A. Sexual Minorities and the FrontieroFactors
Much judicial ink has been spilt on the question whether gays and
lesbians are a suspect class. In this section, I briefly sketch out the
arguments in favor of treating gays and lesbians as a suspect or quasisuspect class based on the many reported cases that have already
addressed the issue. Virtually no cases address the question whether
transgender persons are a suspect or quasi-suspect class, despite the fact
that the arguments for so holding are almost certainly even stronger.
To recap, pre-Frontierocases spoke of the question whether the group
at issue was a "discrete and insular" minority with a history of
discrimination and a lack of political power, and also rejected heightened
scrutiny for large, diverse, and amorphous classes.206 Frontiero identified
six relevant considerations: (1) history of discrimination; (2) visibility of
the characteristic; (3) political powerlessness; (4) an immutable
characteristic determined solely by accident of birth; (5) relationship to
ability to perform or contribute to society; and (6) the fact that a coequal

205. But cf Irizarry, 251 F.3d at 608-09 (noting that Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
a gay rights organization, filed a brief on behalf of the aggrieved heterosexual in the case, arguing that
heightened scrutiny should apply).
206. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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branch of government has recognized the discrimination at issue as
invidious.207 Cleburne effectively eliminated the sixth Frontiero factor by
treating it as a factor demonstrating that the group has political power.208
Moreover, Cleburne arguably narrowed the definition of political
powerlessness, describing such groups as having "no ability to attract the
attention of the lawmakers." 2 0 9 Finally, the Lyng Court grouped and
presented many of the factors in the disjunctive, identifying the relevant
inquiries as: (1) whether the group has suffered a history of discrimination;
(2) whether the group exhibits obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and (3) whether they
are either a minority or politically powerless.210
Nearly every court to consider the matter, even those that hold that
gays and lesbians are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, has found that
two of the Frontierofactors-a history of discrimination211 and no effect
on ability to perform or contribute to society212-point in favor of
heightened scrutiny. Accordingly, much of the debate in lower court
opinions centers on the three remaining considerations: immutability,
political powerlessness, and the visibility of the trait at issue.
With respect to immutability, those courts rejecting heightened scrutiny
for gays and lesbians note that the scientific evidence remains unclear on
the question whether sexual orientation is immutably set at birth or
determined at a later point in time, whether by environment or choice.213

207. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, at least one lower court has
considered this factor and found that it points in favor of subjecting discrimination against gays and
lesbians to heightened scrutiny. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 450-51 (Conn.
2008).
209. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 84.
211. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 182 (2d Cir. 2012), aff'd, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(20 i3); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990); BenShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 1989); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724 (9th
Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 987-88 (S.D. Ohio
2013); Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 959-60 (E.D. Mich. 2013); Pedersen v. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 314-18 (D. Conn. 2012); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F.
Supp. 2d 968, 985-86 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008);
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432-34; Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1226
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) af'd in relevant part, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995); Vamum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862, 889-90 (Iowa 2009); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 609-11 (Md. 2007).
212. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 182-83; Watkins, 875 F.2d at 725; Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at
988-89; Bassett, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 959-60; Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 318-20; Golinski, 824 F.
Supp. 2d at 986; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 434-36; Cox, 627 So.
2d at 1226; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 890-92; Conaway, 932 A.2d at 609.
213. See Conaway, 932 A.2d at 614-16; Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash.
2006). Some decisions have also refused to treat sexual orientation as immutable on the ground that it
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With respect to political powerlessness, those courts rejecting
heightened scrutiny for gays and lesbians rely on Cleburne for the
proposition that this requires a showing that the group has no political
power. Those courts note that gays and lesbians have achieved political
successes and thus-in the words of Cleburne-have the ability to "attract
the attention of the lawmakers."2 14 These courts point to specific political
successes-such as repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell and the legislative
expansion of anti-discrimination and marriage rights 2 15-Open support by
political leaders,2 16 and an increase in the number of openly gay elected
officials.217
Finally, with respect to visibility, at least one court has noted that,
unlike race or sex, sexual orientation is not readily visible, making the
case for heightened scrutiny distinguishable from that for women in
Frontiero: "[T]he continued discrimination against women in 1973 was
largely due to the high visibility of the sex characteristic, a visibility that
the characteristic of homosexuality does not have to nearly the same extent
as gender." 2 18
Courts finding that gays and lesbians are a suspect or quasi-suspect
class often begin with a threshold determination that, strictly speaking,
none of these remaining three factors are required.2 19 In support of this
threshold determination, these courts first note that, as indicated above, the

is "behavioral" and thus fundamentally different from race and sex. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at
573-74; Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989). These pre-Lawrence
decisions, however, seem to be conflating the status of being gay with conduct associated with that
status. Indeed, some of these decisions did not bother with or gave short shrift to the Frontierofactors
on the theory that the Court's decision in Bowers-rejecting a substantive due process claim
challenging sodomy laws-effectively prevented consideration of equal protection claims brought by
gays and lesbians. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571; Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464-65; Woodward,
871 F.2d at 1076; Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
214. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574 (quoting City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 445 (1985)); Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1010 (D. Nev. 2012) (same); Jackson
v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1101-02 (D. Haw. 2012) (quoting High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d
at 574); see Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 466 & n.9; Conaway, 932 A.2d at 611-14; Andersen, 138 P.3d at
974-76..
215. See Sevcik, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 1008, 1013; Conaway, 932 A.2d at 611-14; Andersen, 138
P.3d at 974-75.
216. See Sevcik, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 1008.
217. See id.
218. Id.atlOll.
219. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012), aff'd, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 987 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Pedersen v. Office of
Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326-27 (D. Conn. 2012); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,
824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2012); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008);
Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407, 426-27 (Conn. 2008); Vamum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862, 889 (Iowa 2009).
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Court has, in its most recent summary of the factors in Lyng, presented
many of them in the disjunctive. Thus, a showing of political
powerlessness is not strictly required because the question is whether the
group is a minority or politically powerless, and gays and lesbians, under
any estimate of their percentage of the population, constitute a minority.220
Moreover, a showing of immutability or visibility is not strictly required
because the question is whether the group exhibits obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group. 2 2 1
Separate and apart from the disjunctive presentation of these factors in
cases such as Lyng, these courts note how many of the existing
classifications accorded heightened equal protection scrutiny lack one or
more of these characteristics. First, with respect to immutability, these
courts point out that several suspect and quasi-suspect characteristics can
in fact be changed: people can change their sex through surgery,22 2 aliens
can change their status by becoming naturalized,2 23 the status of children
as illegitimate can be changed through the marriage of their biological
parents or other legitimization procedures, 224 and indeed, it is possible to
change one's racial appearance with pigment injections.22 5 Indeed, so far
as alien status is concerned, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the
argument that it should not be accorded strict scrutiny merely because an
alien has the ability to change that status by becoming naturalized.22 6
Second, with respect to the visibility of the trait, several courts have
noted that neither one's status as an alien nor as illegitimate carries an
obvious badge.227 In addition, they note that, at least in some instances,
people can mask their national origin-such as by changing their names or
customs-and that lighter-skinned African Americans and Latinos can
pass as white.22 8
Finally, with respect to political powerlessness, several courts have
compared the political power of gays and lesbians today with that of

220. See Kerrigan,957 A.2d at 439-40.
221. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183.
222. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring); Wolf
v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1013 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
223. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183 n.4; Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726; Wolf 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1013;
Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 990-91; Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 320; In re MarriageCases, 183
P.3d at 442.
224. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183 n.4; Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726; Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at
990-91; Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 320; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 427 n.20.
225. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726.
226. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n.11 (1977).
227. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183-84; Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
228. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726.
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women and African Americans at the times they were deemed to be
suspect classes and have noted that the latter were certainly not wholly
without political power then, and indeed had far more power than gays and
lesbians do today.229
Despite these threshold arguments, many courts finding gays and
lesbians to be a suspect or quasi-suspect class have nonetheless considered
the immutability, political powerlessness, and visibility factors and have
found that they point in favor of heightened scrutiny.
First, with respect to the immutability factor, numerous court
decisions-particularly
more
recent
ones-point to evidence
demonstrating that sexual orientation is set at birth or shortly thereafter.230
Moreover, many courts, after noting the various types of classifications
that are theoretically mutable but nonetheless accorded heightened
scrutiny, refine the test as one not requiring strict immutability. Rather,
these courts hold, changing the characteristic at issue must be both
"relatively" beyond their control and so integral to their identity that it
would be inappropriate to require them to change it to avoid
discrimination.23 1 So defined, these courts conclude that sexual
orientation-like sex, race, and alienage-should be treated as immutable
because, even if theoretically subject to change, it is difficult to do and
something that is integral to one's identity.
Second, with respect to political powerlessness, these courts identify
several ways in which gays and lesbians are relatively politically
232 h
powerless, noting such things as the absence of statutory protections, the
widespread enactment of anti-gay laws-such as those prohibiting sodomy

229. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 184; Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 430 (M.D. Pa.
2014); Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 990; Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 326-27; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d
at 442, 452-54 & n.52; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 894 (Iowa 2009). Moreover, several state
courts deciding the issue on state law grounds note that this factor does not make much sense, given
that if one were to focus on the current political power of African Americans and women, they should
no longer receive heightened scrutiny. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008);
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 453; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 894.
230. See Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 990-91; Bassett v. Snyder, 951 F. Supp. 2d 939, 960 (E.D.
Mich. 2013); Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 322; Golinski v. U.S. Office ofPers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp.
2d 968, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1226
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) affd in relevantpart, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995).
231. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183 n.4; Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726; Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at
990-91; Bassett, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 960; Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 325-26; Golinski, 824 F. Supp.
2d at 986-87; In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442-43; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 438; Varnum, 763
N.W.2d at 893; Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 884 (N.M. 2013).
232. See Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 989; Bassett, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 960; Pedersen, 881 F.
Supp. 2d at 327-28; Griego, 316 P.3d at 883-84.
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and marriage 233-the absence of significant numbers of openly gay elected
officials, 2 34 the group's small size and dispersion, 23 5 and the risks of being
"out of the closet" that make it hard for gays and lesbians to organize to
exercise political power.236 Moreover, these courts cite a different quote
from Cleburne that seems to suggest that the question of political
powerlessness turns not on whether the group is wholly lacking in political
power, but rather whether the group's political power is such that the
existing discrimination against the group is unlikely to soon be rectified by
legislative means.237

Finally, with respect to visibility, and taking into consideration traits
such as illegitimacy, alienage, and national origin that likewise are not
visible, these courts recast this factor as meaning that the trait becomes
obvious once the person seeks to obtain some government benefit for
which disclosure of such facts is necessary, and note that for gays and
lesbians, their sexual orientation, even if not normally readily visible,
becomes apparent when they do such things as seek to obtain a license to
marry someone of the same sex.238
In sum, although there is precedent on both sides of the issue, there are
certainly persuasive arguments for why discrimination against gays and
lesbians should be subjected to heightened scrutiny under the equal
protection clause based on the Frontierofactors. Moreover, although there
is a dearth of precedent on the issue,239 the above arguments apply with
equal if not greater force for transgender persons. So far as minority status
or political powerlessness is concerned, they represent an even smaller
percentage of the population and have far less political influence than gays
and lesbians. Moreover, the discrimination against the group is far more
significant, as even jurisdictions that ban discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation often fail to guard against discrimination on the basis of

233. See Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 987-88; Bassett, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 960; Pedersen, 881 F.
Supp. 2d at 314-18; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 447-50 & n.43; Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1226; Varnum, 763
N.W.2d at 889-90; Griego, 316 P.3d at 883-84.
234. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 184-85; Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727; Bassett, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 960;
Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 328; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 446-47; Griego, 316 P.3d at 882.
235. See Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
236. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 185; Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727; Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 98990; Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1226; Griego, 316 P.3d at 882-83.
237. See Windsor, 699 F.3d at 184-85; Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 989-90; Pedersen, 881 F.
Supp. 2d at 329; Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 987; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 444; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at
894.
238. See, e.g., Windsor, 699 F.3d at 183-84.
239. The only federal court decisions to give it attention many decades ago held that heightened
scrutiny was inapplicable because the trait is not an immutable one. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977).
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gender identity. In addition, the scientific research to date shows the status
of being transgender to be immutable; one cannot change their
psychological gender.2 40 Furthermore, the characteristic becomes visible
when a person seeks to alter their physical sex to conform to their
psychological sex. Finally, there is no evidence that being transgender
bears any relationship to one's ability to perform and contribute to society.
Accordingly, for the purposes of the remainder of this section and the
next section, this Article assumes that gay and transgender persons qualify
as classes entitled to heightened equal protection scrutiny, and proceeds to
consider the impact of that assumption on the ability of heterosexuals
aggrieved by gayffirmative action policies to likewise argue for
heightened equal protection scrutiny.
B. Sexual Minoritiesand Adarand Consistency
Assume, for the reasons set forth in the previous subsection, that the
U.S. Supreme Court eventually concludes that gay and transgender
persons qualify as suspect or quasi-suspect classes entitled to heightened
scrutiny, or that the relevant circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals has
precedent so holding, as does the Second Circuit.24 1 Suppose further that a
gayffirmative action policy is established, and an aggrieved heterosexual
seeks to challenge it. With heightened scrutiny already established for
discrimination againstsexual minorities, the question whether the plaintiff
can likewise argue for heightened scrutiny turns solely on the question
whether Adarand's principle of consistency would apply to an equal
protection claim brought by a heterosexual claiming sexual orientation
discrimination.
In many ways, it seems hard to argue that Adarand's consistency
principle should not apply to sexual orientation claims. After all, as
demonstrated in Part I of this Article, the seeds of the consistency
principle were sown long before Croson and Adarand were decided, with
the Court applying it sub silentio to sex classifications 242 and assuming
that it would apply if the Court treated the mentally retarded as a quasisuspect class.243 In line with this general trajectory, one lower court has
concluded that the consistency principle would apply to policies granting

240.
241.
242.
243.

See
See
See
See

In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 75-77 (Md. 2003).
Windsor, 699 F.3dat 181-85.
supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
supranotes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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preferential treatment to other suspect groups, such as aliens, 244 and the
handful of courts and commentators that have addressed the issue have
* 245
indicated that the same result would follow for sexual orientation.
Yet despite the allure of having a "consistency" principle that applies
consistently across all classifications, it might nonetheless be possible to
argue against it being extended to encompass sexual orientation
classifications. As an initial matter, it is worth emphasizing that the Court
has applied it only in the contexts of sex and race discrimination. In
addition, although Cleburne seems to assume its application more
generally, that assumption was not necessary to deciding the case.
Moreover, many of the cases in the Adarand line emphasize the
importance of racialclassifications and suggest that race is different. For
example, in Bakke, Justice Powell suggested that race and ethnicity were
sui generis.24 Justice O'Connor did much the same in Adarand, in which
she focused specifically on the long history of misuse of race as a basis for
treating all racial classifications with skepticism. 247 And the specific
language of the consistency principle in both Croson and Adarandwas not
248
written in general terms but rather in specific reference to race.
However, I would suggest a more critical distinction in both the race
and sex cases that would explain why a consistency principle was
necessary in those cases but is not necessary in the context of sexual
orientation. Specifically, one needs to consider the context of the initial
heightened scrutiny cases involving race and sex to see why a consistency
principle made sense for those two types of classifications.
The two race cases in which strict scrutiny was first clearly
articulated-McLaughlin and Loving-involved laws criminalizing
249
interracial pairings of different sorts. In any given pairing, it is unclear
which person is being discriminating against. Indeed, the Court in these
cases had to rebut arguments, based on its own precedent, that no racial
discrimination was involved at all because whites and non-whites were
equally prohibited from engaging in the conduct with people of opposite

244. See Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2012). See generally Pemberthy v.
Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 871 n.19 (3d Cir. 1994).
245. See Commonwealth v. Chau, No. 08-P-2043, 2010 WL 1655526, at *3 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr.
27, 2010); David A. Strauss, supranote 197..
246. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
247. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213-27 (1995).
248. See id at 224, 227; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
249. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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races. 20 Thus, viewing the strict scrutiny standard as applying consistently
whenever race is taken into account, without looking to the race of the
specific plaintiff, made sense given the context in which these cases arose.
Because consistency was necessary to deciding these cases, it would have
been difficult, or at least awkward, for the Court to back away from that in
subsequent cases in which a principle of consistency was not strictly
necessary.
The early sex discrimination cases in which heightened scrutiny was
recognized similarly involved situations in which a consistency prism was
necessary because it was unclear whether men or women were being
discriminated against, as each of these early cases involved a denial of
benefits to spouses. Keep in mind that these cases were decided in a world
in which same-sex marriage was not in existence, and so all married
pairings were necessary male-female. For example, at issue in Frontiero
was the constitutionality of a federal statutory scheme whereby male
members of the armed forces automatically received medical and other
benefits for their wives because they were presumed to be dependent upon
their husbands, whereas female members of the armed forces could
receive such benefits for their husbands only if they could first prove the
dependence.25 1 Were such laws discriminating against the female
servicemembers, or their male husbands who were denied the benefits?
Indeed, in Frontiero, the servicemember and her husband brought suit
jointly.252 Other pre-Craigcases involved similar circumstances, such as a
provision of the Social Security Act allowing a surviving wife to receive
benefits based on the earnings of her deceased husband but not providing
for a surviving husband to do the same based on the earnings of his
deceased wife.253 Who was discriminated against in that case, the earning
wife whose social security benefits effectively had less value than those of
a male earner, or the surviving male spouse who was denied the benefits?
Thus, just as with cases like McLaughlin and Loving, a principle of
consistency made sense. And having established that principle early on,
subsequently backing away from it would have been difficult.
While I thus believe that there are significant ways in which the Court
can distinguish the existing Adarand line of cases, it is nonetheless
conceivable, indeed likely, that the Court would extend its rationale to

250.
251.
252.
253.

See Loving, 388 U.S. at 10-11; McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188-91.
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 (1973) (plurality opinion).
See id. at 680 & n.4.
See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-38 (1975).
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encompass sexual orientation classifications. For purposes of the next Part,
I assume that to be the Court's likely trajectory.
IV. MUST A HETEROSEXUAL "WAIT IN LINE" TO OBTAIN HEIGHTENED
SCRUTINY?

Thus far, the U.S. Supreme Court has not designated gays and lesbians
to be a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to intermediate or strict
equal protection scrutiny, and there is only one federal circuit-the
Second-with precedent so holding.254 (The Ninth Circuit, without
specifying the level of review, recently held that the scrutiny for
discrimination against gays and lesbians is "heightened." 2 55 ) Accordingly,
if an equal protection challenge is brought against a gayffirmative action
policy by an aggrieved heterosexual outside of the Second and Ninth
Circuits, the legal question is not merely whether Adarand's consistency
principle applies outside of the contexts of race and sex discrimination.
The question is whether a heterosexual can invoke heightened scrutiny
without that level of scrutiny having first been established for laws
discriminating against sexual minorities. There are five possible responses
to this question:
1. No, he must first wait for that level of scrutiny to be established
in a case involving discrimination against sexual minorities, and
only then seek extension of that level of scrutiny to discrimination
against heterosexuals by invoking that new precedent in conjunction
with Adarand.
2. Yes, but in so doing, he must argue the various ways in which
the Frontiero factors demonstrate that heterosexuals are politically
powerless, have suffered from a history of discrimination, and the
like.
3. Yes, but in so doing, he must argue the various ways in which
the Frontiero factors demonstrate that his opposite, i.e., gays and

lesbians, are politically powerless, have suffered from a history of
discrimination, and the like.

254. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181-85 (2d Cir. 2012), aff'd, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013).
255. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs.,
740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014).
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4. Yes, by invoking the Moreno line of cases and contending that
heterosexuals are a politically unpopular group.
5. Yes, and in so doing, he must get the court to think about the
Frontiero factors in a more abstract way that harmonizes them with
the Adarand principle.
I can envision litigants arguing for and lower courts accepting each of
the first four responses. As I explain below, although the first three
responses might be said to follow mechanically from the Court's
precedents, they are largely nonsensical if one accepts the Adarand line of
precedent as settled law that is applicable across the board. The fourth
response, while raising some interesting questions about the scope of the
Moreno line of cases, seems unlikely to bear fruit. Only the fifth response,
if accepted, will ultimately harmonize the Frontiero, Adarand, and
Moreno lines of precedent.
A. The MechanicalResponses
The first three responses are emblematic of a lawyer or jurist who has
memorized and can recite complex constitutional doctrine, but does not, in
truth, understand it. I address each of them briefly here, cognizant of the
possibility that a lower court may nonetheless feel compelled to accept one
of them on the theory that it is for the Supreme Court, not lower courts, to
blaze new trails.
The first response-that an aggrieved heterosexual must wait until a
sexual minority establishes heightened scrutiny in a case involving
discrimination against sexual minorities before arguing for its extension to
laws discriminating against heterosexuals-treats these two lines of
precedent as artificially independent and hopelessly wooden. After all, if
heterosexuals will be able to instantly and forever after invoke that level of
heightened scrutiny upon the establishment of the same in a case involving
discrimination against sexual minorities, what sensible concept of
constitutional law would force the aggrieved heterosexual to sit idly
waiting for that precedent to first be established?
There is, however, one possible defense of this first response. It may be
that the Court intends Adarand consistency to follow not instantly from
recognition of a group as suspect or quasi-suspect, but rather with a delay.
After all, that was the pattern followed for race and, to a lesser extent,

782

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 92:733

sex. 256 During this lag period, laws discriminating against the group are
subject to heightened scrutiny, while those designed to benefit them are
not, allowing legislatures greater flexibility to remedy the history of
discrimination against the group. But at some point, the political power of
the suspect or quasi-suspect group may shift, such that the political
powerlessness arguments for heightened scrutiny may no longer hold, as
Justice Scalia has suggested is the case for women.2 57 Moreover, it need
not (and probably never would) shift to the point that the minority group
becomes the majority;25 8 rather, it suffices that they progress politically to
the point that they can, at least in some instances, hold the balance of
power.259 Yet because the Court never downgrades a suspect or quasisuspect group once it has recognized them as such,260 the Court's solution
to this change in political power is to apply the Adarand consistency
principle as a way of effectively downgrading the group's heightened
scrutiny.

The second response-that an aggrieved heterosexual must
demonstrate that heterosexuals are politically powerless, have suffered
from a history of discrimination, and the like-is a response that has on
occasion been given by courts when a law appearing to give preferential
treatment to a minority group (for which heightened scrutiny has not been
established) has been challenged, such as for laws that appear to
discriminate against heterosexuals or the wealthy. 261 This response tracks
the dissents of Justice Rehnquist in Craig and Justice Marshall in Croson,
who contended that heightened scrutiny should not be extended,
respectively, to men and whites on the theory that those groups do not
satisfy the Frontiero factors.262 Yet, as demonstrated above, the Court
rejected those dissents. To be sure, in those cases, the Frontiero and
Adarand lines of cases were invoked serially, not in tandem. But given the
change that Adarandhas made to the legal landscape, allowing heightened
scrutiny for heterosexuals only if they can show that they have suffered

256. See supra text accompanying notes 51-58, 69-72, 89-117.
257. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258. But see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295-97 (1978).
259. See Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. City of Columbus, 733 F. Supp. 1156, 1158-59 (S.D. Ohio
1990).
260. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 502 n.25 (Conn. 2008) (Borden, J.,
dissenting).
261. See Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604, 610 (7th Cir. 2001); Jensen v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 104, 111.
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from a history of discrimination and are politically powerless would seem
to unduly straightjacket equal protection jurisprudence.
The third response is perhaps the least mechanical of this group. Under
this response, heterosexuals are free to argue for heightened scrutiny in the
first instance, invoking the Frontiero and Adarand lines of precedent.
Moreover, it is not necessary for them to show that heterosexuals satisfy
the Frontierofactors, which they almost surely would not. Rather, so long
as they can show that their opposite-gays and lesbians-can do so, they
can establish heightened equal protection scrutiny across the board for
sexual orientation. While certainly a plausible way to reconcile the
Frontiero and Adarand lines of precedent, it is an awfully bizarre way to
ask the heterosexual plaintiff to make the case for why heightened equal
protection scrutiny should apply to his case, to wit, by speaking of the
political powerlessness and history of discrimination against a group to
which he does not belong. Perhaps the answer is that the plaintiffs role in
this scenario is bizarre because Adarand itself is an aberration. That might
be so, but the Court clearly accepts Adarand and is unlikely to reconcile
the two lines of cases in such a Frankensteinesque manner.
B. Heterosexualsas a "PoliticallyUnpopularGroup"?
Perhaps the way for an aggrieved heterosexual to obtain some form of
heightened scrutiny is the same way that gays and lesbians have thus far
achieved it: by invoking Moreno-style "fleeting rational basis plus" review
under fact patterns that show evidence of animus in the legislative history.
Consider in this regard the medical school affirmative action policy set
forth in the introduction, with a new caveat. At the faculty meeting, while
introducing the policy, the lead sponsor states, "The best thing about this
policy is I'm guaranteed to see five percent fewer 'breeders' each time I
walk into class." The faculty receive the policy with laughter and vote
resoundingly in favor of it. Assume further that the medical school has a
lesbian dean and sexual minorities in a variety of key leadership positions.
This hypothetical raises important questions of what it means to be a
"politically unpopular group" within the meaning of the MorenoCleburne-Romer line of cases. To be politically unpopular seems to be
another way of saying that a group is politically powerless, thus
overlapping with one of the Frontiero factors. Is it about political power
generally-say a group's national political power-or is it a more
localized, case-specific analysis of a group's political power in a given
circumstance, such that a group that is politically powerful in general may
be politically neutered in a given context, as was the case under the facts
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of Croson2 63 or the hypothetical jurisdiction in Strauder in which whites
were in the minority? 26
A review of lower court precedent addressing the issue suggests that
the analysis whether a group qualifies as politically unpopular is often not
done at the micro-level, but rather at a macro-level. For example, despite
the fact that numerous political bodies have enacted laws targeting
Walmart, courts have rejected arguments that the retailer or other similar,
generally powerful entities should be characterized as "politically
unpopular group[s]" within the meaning of Moreno and its progeny.2 65 In
contrast, lower courts have held that groups such as day laborers266 and the
homeless 267 satisfy Moreno's definition. The bulk of lower court precedent
thus seems to align the analysis here with the political powerlessness
analysis associated with the application of the Frontiero factors, limiting
the application of fleeting rational basis review to situations involving a
minority group-albeit not one that qualifies generally for intermediate or
strict scrutiny-being disadvantaged by the majority 268 that is historically
unpopular and politically vulnerable.2 69 Such a characterization might
encompass hippies, the mentally retarded, day laborers, and the homeless
but not a large and otherwise powerful retailer. Under this limited
interpretation of Moreno's scope, heterosexuals would not seem to qualify
as a "politically unpopular group."
On the other hand, some courts do seem to conduct a more micro-level
analysis, focusing on the particular geographic and political context in
which a given targeted group operates. For example, even though there is
significant support for abortion rights generally and Planned Parenthood
and other abortion providers specifically, numerous lower courts have held
that Planned Parenthood qualifies as a politically unpopular group, noting

263. See text accompanying note 113.
264. See text accompanying notes 92-93.
265. See Mountain Water Co. v. Mont. Dep't of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 919 F.2d 593, 599 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that private utility companies do not meet the definition of a politically unpopular
group); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 501 (D. Md. 2006). But see WalMart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1037-39 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (noting the
dearth of precedent on this issue, and holding that the argument was not "totally without merit").
266. See Doe v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520, 552 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
267. See Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1113 (E.D. Cal. 2012); Chosen 300
Ministries, Inc. v. City of Phila., No. 12-3159, 2012 WL 3235317, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2012)
(collecting cases).
268. See Williams v. King, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1250-53 (N.D. Ala. 2006), af'd sub nom.
Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316 (1lth Cir. 2007).
269. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012);
Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1224 (10th Cir. 2004); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of
Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1119 n.6 (10th Cir. 1991).
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its unpopularity among some segments of the population.270 Viewed
through this prism, it seems plausible that heterosexuals could-in the
right political and geographic context (such as a factual context akin to
that in Croson)-satisfythe definition.
The Court-speaking through Justice Kennedy-in its Moreno line of
cases appears to endorse the micro-approach over the macro-approach. In
Kelo v. City of New London,27 1 Justice Kennedy stated that "a court
applying rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause must
strike down a government classification that is clearly intended to injure a
particular class of private parties, with only incidental or pretextual public
justifications."272 So described, the standard seems to be of universal
application, and not limited to traditionally vulnerable parties.
To be sure, a criticism of considering a micro-level analysis would note
Justice White's comment in Cleburne that "[a]ny minority can be said to
be powerless to assert direct control over the legislature, but if that were a
criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts, much economic and social
legislation would now be suspect." 27 3 But of course there, Justice White
was speaking of the possibility of applying the strong medicine of either
intermediate or strict scrutiny. In contrast, fleeting rational basis plus
review is seldom that blunt of a tool.
Yet another criticism might be that since there is almost always some
political loser in any political decision, this interpretation of Moreno
would signal a return to the Lochner days of heavy-handed rational basis
review to scrutinize and strike down legislation. However, there are
several limitations on the scope of Moreno-style review that make it
unlikely to be a significant intrusion into legislative powers.
First, in order for its heightened standard to apply, the cases suggest
that there needs to be some evidence of animus in the legislative record, or
a desire to punish or target a particular group. 274 Thus, in the absence of
such evidence, this more intense review does not take place.

270. See Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 545-46 (9th Cir. 2004); Greenville
Women's Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 205 (4th Cir. 2000); Planned Parenthood v. Minnesota, 612
F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir. 1980), affd, 448 U.S. 901; Planned Parenthood v. Cansler, 877 F. Supp. 2d
310, 327 (M.D.N.C. 2012); Planned Parenthood v. Dreyzehner, 853 F. Supp. 2d 724, 737-38 (M.D.
Tenn. 2012).
271. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
272. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
273. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
274. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448;
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 383 n.18 (1974); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
538 (1973).
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Second, even when Moreno-style review applies, it is more akin to
"hard look" administrative review than true heightened scrutiny. Thus,
according to the Court, the presence of evidence of animus in the record
"does not a constitutional violation make";2 7 5 so long as there is a rational
basis for the law, the Court will still uphold it in spite of that evidence.276
Finally, in her concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O'Connor
suggested a third limitation on Moreno-style review: in general, it is only
likely to result in laws inhibiting personal relationships being declared
unconstitutional, and does not apply to ordinary economic legislation.277
Of course, even if the micro-level approach to Moreno were to rule the
day, it likely would not ultimately help an aggrieved heterosexual in the
affirmative action hypothetical described above. To be sure, the statement
by the policy's sponsor might be sufficient evidence of animus to have a
court give the policy a hard look, but it is likely that the court will also
find a variety of rational bases for such a law, independent of that animus.
Finally, unlike the laws at issue in cases such as Moreno, Cleburne, and
Romer, it would be hard to characterize an affirmative action policy as
inhibiting personal relationships, at least in the way Justice O'Connor
suggested, which appeared to focus primarily on intimate settings and the
home.
C. A New Paradigm
In my view, the best way to harmonize the Moreno, Frontiero, and
Adarand lines of cases is to formally re-conceptualize them as
representing two distinct paths to obtaining heightened equal protection
scrutiny, and to realign and abstract the Frontiero factors in a way that
aligns with the distinct purposes of these two different categories of
heightened equal protection scrutiny.
Moreno-style review is fleeting, not permanent. It is not designed to
identify a suspect or quasi-suspect trait and thereafter apply heightened

275. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001).
276. See Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Gallagher v.
City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1021 (8th Cir. 2012); Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61-62 (1st Cir.
2008); Univ. Prof'ls of Ill. v. Edgar, 114 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 1997); N.Y. Trawlers Ass'n v.
Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1310 (2d Cir. 1994); Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1104-05
(D. Haw. 2012) (noting that it applies only where there is a bare desire to harm a group, not where
there are other justifications for the law).
277. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring); accord
Kleinsmith v. Shurtleff, 571 F.3d 1033, 1048 (10th Cir. 2009); Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 122325 (10th Cir. 2004); Hope for Families & Cmty. Serv., Inc., v. Warren, 721 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1152
n.75 (M.D. Ala. 2010).
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scrutiny to laws discriminating on that basis. Rather, it is designed for
breakdowns in the political process, like when a legislature selects a
particular course of conduct with the purpose of targeting and harming a
situation-specific, politically unpopular group. In this circumstance, the
target of the legislation can truly be said to be politically powerless, and
the Court's temporary intervention would seem to be consistent with
footnote four of Carolene Products, which is concerned generally with
breakdowns in the political process. 27 8 Accordingly, the "political
powerlessness" consideration that is often a part of the Frontieroanalysis
is best excised from that context and considered part of the criteria for
fleeting rational basis plus review, with political powerlessness defined at
the micro-level rather than at the macro-level.
This leaves four other major factors for courts to consider in deciding
whether permanent intermediate or strict scrutiny is appropriate for
particular classifications under a Frontiero-Adarandanalysis. Of these,
three of them are already well-suited to Adarand's consistency principle,
and thus do not require any abstraction or re-characterization at all:
immutability, visibility, and relationship to ability to perform or contribute
to society. Consider each of these in the context of sexual orientation. If
homosexuality is immutable, visible, and unrelated to ability to perform or
contribute to society as those terms have been defined in the case law, then
heterosexuality is likewise immutable,279 visible, and unrelated to ability to
perform or contribute to society. The same holds for other types of suspect
or quasi-suspect classifications, such as sex and race.
That leaves the history of discrimination factor. This factor can easily
be re-characterized so that the question is not whether the specific class
that the plaintiff is a member of has suffered a history of discrimination,
but instead whether there has been a history of misuse of a generally
irrelevant characteristic. While the actual history will in virtually every
instance involve solely misuse targeting the minority group, in the long
run, concern over misuse of a generally irrelevant characteristic is a
concern for all. Many of the decisions in the Adarandline of cases seem to
suggest a concern that, given a long history of misuse of a generally
irrelevant characteristic, once the minority has been able to obtain some

278. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (indicating that
heightened scrutiny is warranted both when there is "legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" as well as
when there is "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . .. which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities") (emphasis

added).
279. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring).
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degree of political power, the reverberations of history are likely to result
in retaliatory action aimed at the majority group. 280 Thus, such a history of
misuse warrants greater scrutiny by the courts whenever that characteristic
comes into play. Indeed, the Court's more recent decisions discuss the
history of misuse of race or sex in opinions in which the aggrieved
plaintiff is white or male.28
To be sure, there are many critics of Adarand's consistency principle,
and they might find my proposed refinement of the Frontiero factors
abhorrent to their preferred interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
But Adarand is here to stay, and the unresolved tension between it and the
Frontiero line of cases has done much to harm efforts to advance the
rights of sexual minorities and other minority groups because it has
effectively stalled the development of the Frontiero line of cases. Only by
providing a map for the Court to harmonize the two lines of cases is there
hope for the Court to add to its list of suspect and quasi-suspect
classifications.
V. THE RELEVANCE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

Suppose that little or none of what I have discussed thus far comes to
fruition. Instead, the Court explicitly holds that under the U.S.
Constitution, discrimination against gays and lesbians is entitled only to
rational basis scrutiny. Or the Court reserves judgment on that question
but holds that until that issue is resolved, a heterosexual cannot
successfully invoke heightened scrutiny. Under those circumstances, is
there any other way that an aggrieved heterosexual plaintiff can obtain
heightened equal protection scrutiny of a gayffirmative action policy?
It is an elemental principle of constitutional law that the U.S.
Constitution sets a floor, not a ceiling, and thus that states are able to
interpret parallel provisions in their own constitutions to provide greater
protections than are provided by the U.S. Constitution.282 Moreover, the
Court has made clear that this principle extends to how states interpret
their analogues to the Equal Protection Clause.283 Numerous states have

280. See generally City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosen Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 495-96 (1989)
(plurality opinion); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295-99 (1978).
281. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136-39 (1994); Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 650-51 (1993).
282. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's
Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980);
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
283. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981).
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opted to do so in various contexts, with many states applying strict instead
of merely intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on sex284 or
legitimacy. 285 Moreover, a number of states have applied intermediate or
strict scrutiny instead of merely rational basis review to classifications
based on age, 2 86 wealth, 287 or disability. 2 88 And most relevant to this

Article, several states have held that discrimination against gays and
lesbians is subject to intermediate or strict scrutiny, including
California, 28 9 Connecticut, 2 90 and Iowa. 2 9 1
Thus, suppose the gayffirmative action policy at issue were established
at a state university in California, Connecticut, or Iowa. Would courts in
those states apply the Adarand principle, as a matter of state constitutional
law, to subject laws discriminating against heterosexuals to intermediate
or strict scrutiny? Must they do so as a matter of federal constitutional
law?
As to the first question, only a handful of decisions have addressed the
issue-all outside of the context of sexual orientation discrimination-and
they have provided mixed results (many others have simply applied the
consistency rule without discussion).292 For example, California courts,
which have long applied strict scrutiny to sex-based discrimination, have
held that such scrutiny also applies to affirmative action policies designed
to benefit women.293 In contrast, California courts, which have also held
that laws that discriminate against the poor are subject to strict scrutiny (at
least in some circumstances), have rejected an argument that consistency

284. See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 539-40 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993); People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98, 101 (1Il. 1974); Commonwealth v. Chou,
741 N.E.2d 17, 24 n.6 (Mass. 2001); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 554 A.2d 366, 386 (Md. 1989);
Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 653 P.2d 970, 977-78 (Or. 1982); In re McLean, 725
S.W.2d 696, 697-98 (Tex. 1987); Peters v. Narick, 270 S.E.2d 760, 763-66 (W. Va. 1980).
285. See Taylor v. Hoffman, 544 S.E.2d 387, 392 (W. Va. 2001); Adkins v. McEldowney, 280
S.E.2d 231, 233 (W. Va. 1981).
286. See Hamm v. Phila. Bd. of Educ., 9 Pa. D. & C.3d 388, 393 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1979); State v.
Anderson, 996 So. 2d 973, 1010-11 (La. 2008).
287. See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 950-51 (Cal. 1976), supplemented by 569 P.2d 1303
(Cal. 1977).
288. See Rayhall v. Akim Co., 819 A.2d 803, 813 (Conn. 2003); Frandsen v. Cnty. of Brevard,
800 So. 2d 757, 759-60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Schs., 120 P.3d 413, 41923 (N.M. 2005).
289. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 78 (Cal. 2009); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,44144 (Cal. 2008).
290. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431-82 (Conn. 2008).
291. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885-96 (Iowa 2009).
292. See, e.g., People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ill. 1974); Commonwealth v. Chou, 741
N.E.2d 17, 24 n.6 (Mass. 2001); Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 653 P.2d 970, 977-78 (Or.
1982); In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696, 697-98 (Tex. 1987).
293. See Connerlyv. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 25-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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requires an extension of that level of scrutiny to laws that discriminate
against the wealthy.294 Moreover, Connecticut courts, which accord strict
scrutiny to laws that discriminate against the disabled, do not extend that
same level of scrutiny to laws that discriminate in their favor.295
As to the second question, it would appear that states are free to impose
differing levels of scrutiny on laws discriminating against sexual
minorities and those discriminating against heterosexuals and not run afoul
of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution so long as federal
precedent accords only rational basis scrutiny to such classifications. To
be sure, a state constitutional provision can be deemed to run afoul of the
federal Equal Protection Clause,296 and the Court has made clear that a
state constitutional provision that is interpreted so as to expansively grant
rights to one group can, in the course of so doing, violate the federal
constitutional rights of another and be subject to challenge on that
ground.297
But the Adarand line of cases does not declare a federal constitutional
right to have a "consistent" level of scrutiny applied across the board by
state courts interpreting state analogues to the federal Equal Protection
Clause. Instead, those decisions set a federal floor for equal protection
review, requiring a minimum of strict scrutiny for racial classifications and
intermediate scrutiny for sex classifications. Thus, a state that opted to
apply intermediate scrutiny to laws discriminating against women but only
rational basis review to laws discriminating against men would run afoul
of the federal Equal Protection Clause, as would a state that opted to apply
strict scrutiny to laws discriminating against racial minorities but only
intermediate scrutiny to laws discriminating against whites.
Yet, if a state decided to satisfy the federal constitutional floor for one
class-such as heterosexuals-and to impose a higher level of scrutiny for
its counterpart-sexual minorities-the constitutionality of that scheme
would turn on whether it satisfies the level of federal equal protection
scrutiny normally applied to those types of classifications. If the federal
Equal Protection Clause thus provides only for rational basis review of
sexual orientation classifications, the federal constitutional question would

294. See Jensen v. Franchise Tax Bd., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); People v.
Mitchell, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150, 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
295. See Pasquariello v. Stop and Shop Cos., Inc., 916 A.2d 803, 813 (Conn. 2007); Rayhall v.
Akim Co., 819 A.2d 803, 814 (Conn. 2003).
296. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
297. See PnneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (noting that expansive
interpretation of state's analogue to First Amendment can run afoul of federal Takings Clause to the
extent it provides a right to engage in that conduct on the private property of others).
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reduce itself to whether it is rational for the state constitution to subject
such laws to differing levels of scrutiny depending upon the class
impacted. The same deference under that standard that results in upholding
the constitutionality of most specific laws discriminating on a non-suspect
basis should likewise result in upholding the constitutionality of such a
state constitutional scheme.
In this sense, inconsistency by states via the application of their
analogues to the federal Equal Protection Clause is no different than any
other form of inconsistency that occurs when a state chooses to
discriminate in favor of or against any given class. If a state's decision to
discriminate against sexual minorities is subject only to rational basis
review under the federal Equal Protection Clause when a state chooses to
permit only heterosexuals to marry or adopt children, then logically its
decision to discriminate in favor of sexual minorities through the
application of a more stringent level of scrutiny under the state analogue to
the federal Equal Protection Clause should similarly be subject only to
rational basis review.
In sum, it may be that an aggrieved plaintiff living in one of the
handful of states that have applied heightened scrutiny under their state
constitutions to laws discriminating against sexual minorities might, as a
matter of state constitutional law, persuasively argue for extension of that
standard to laws discriminating against heterosexuals. But if a state
declines to do so, a federal constitutional challenge to such a scheme rises
or falls on the same arguments as those involved in determining whether
to have heightened scrutiny under the federal Equal Protection Clause for
sexual orientation classifications.
CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have demonstrated the various ways in which a
heterosexual plaintiff could challenge a sexual orientation-based
affirmative action policy. I have argued that such a plaintiff should be able
to argue for heightened equal protection scrutiny for sexual orientation
classifications without waiting for that standard to first be established in a
case involving discrimination against sexual minorities. In the course of so
doing, I have provided a roadmap for harmonizing several of the Court's
parallel and sometimes contradictory lines of equal protection precedent.
While at first glance, it might seem strange to use such a case to
establish heightened equal protection scrutiny for sexual orientation
classifications, it would not be the first time the Court has furthered the
longer-term interests of minorities in a case in which the aggrieved party
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was in the majority. As an example, the Court first declared the
constitutionality of hate crimes statutes in a case in which the victim was
white and the perpetrators were black.298 Moreover, with Justice Kennedy
as the swing vote in (and author of) each of the major gay rights cases
decided by the Court, his support for gay rights coupled with his general
distaste for affirmative action might make such a case the perfect factual
setting for the Court to announce heightened scrutiny for sexual
orientation discrimination and also resolve a longstanding tension in the
Court's equal protection precedents.It may be that the Court will instead
choose to establish heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation
classifications in a more traditional way. Specifically, the Court is set to
issue an opinion in 2015 addressing the question whether state laws
prohibiting same-sex marriage violate equal protection. 2 99 The Court might
opt to apply heightened equal protection scrutiny in that case, and in a
subsequent case address the question whether that same level of
heightened scrutiny would apply to laws that discriminate in favor of
sexual minorities. Anticipating that possibility, this Article has likewise
provided a roadmap for harmonizing the tension in the Court's equal
protection precedents in such a serial fashion.

298. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
299. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S.
Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-571).

